Against Non-Evidential Epistemic Justification for Commitments to Hinge Propositions

  • Changshuo SUN (Speaker)

Activity: Talks or PresentationsOther Invited Talks or Presentations


Hinge propositions are propositions expressing that one is not in skeptical scenarios, e.g., the proposition that one is not a brain in a vat. In order to solve a puzzle about hinge propositions, Annalisa Coliva (2015) argues that we have non-evidential epistemic justification for commitments to hinge propositions. In this talk, I will argue that Coliva’s argument fails. Coliva’s argument relies on her claim that committing to the hinge propositions is part of our practice of acquiring perceptual evidence. I shall argue:

1) In order to show that we have epistemic justification to commit to hinge propositions, Coliva must give a reason to engage in the practice of acquiring perceptual evidence;

2) Coliva faces a dilemma when she tries to give a reason to engage in the practice of acquiring perceptual evidence. The upshot of the dilemma is that Coliva either fails to give an epistemic reason to commit to hinge propositions or faces a variant of the Truth Fairy objection, which is an objection to epistemic consequentialism.
Period3 Apr 2024
Held atDepartment of Philosophy