DescriptionThe talk aims to better illuminate the nature and urgency of the so-called problem of logical omniscience, understood as a problem for the theory of propositional content in particular. I argue that the standard explication of the problem — the problem of intensionality — obfuscates important distinctions, has an unhelpfully narrow scope, and invites various distractions. Accordingly, it creates the illusion of easy (dis)solutions. I then introduce a novel explication of the problem — the surgical problem of relative mathematical omniscience — and argue that it outperforms the problem of intensionality along the aforementioned dimensions. In particular, it offers a uniform platform for critiquing a vast array of proposed solutions to the problem of logical omniscience, including straightforward appeals to structured propositions, impossible worlds, topic- or question-sensitivity, partial states, meta-linguistic pragmatics, adverbialism for the propositional attitudes, and fragmented knowledge states.
|1 Mar 2021
|The New York Philosophy of Language Workshop
|New York, United States