Description
Lenman's cluelessness argument is widely considered as the strongest version of the epistemic argument against Consequentialism. According to the argument, moral agents cannot know either ex ante or ex post a significant percentage of the possible outcomes (also known as the "sample space ignorance"). As a result, Consequentialism cannot provide correct moral guidance. In this paper, I propose an optimistic perspective on the Cluelessness Argument. Firstly, I suggest a hybrid approach based on Burch-Brown's statistical inference proposal and Greaves' imprecise credence proposal. I argue that when we are ignorant of the sample space of a given action, we are rationally required to hold imprecise credence. As we observe more similar actions, the imprecise credence we hold becomes increasingly precise. Secondly, I draw on Walley's imprecise Dirichlet model (IDM), which is a model for agents under sample-space ignorance. IDM aligns well with the hybrid approach that I propose. Under IDM, an epistemically responsible agent can assign upper and lower probabilities to any possible consequence of a moral action. The upper and lower probabilities are determined by three variables: 1) how carious the agent is; 2) the number of times that the action in question has been repeated; 3) the number of times that the possible outcomes occurred. The precision of the credence an agent holds increases as the action in question is repeated more times. Finally, I suggest a new form of Consequentialism based on the hybrid approach, which I call Imprecise Consequentialism. I argue that the Imprecise Consequentialism is better than traditional Consequentialist theories, as it can provide meaningful action guidance when we do not know all possible outcomes of an action under consideration. I discuss three different situations in which Imprecise Consequentialism guides our actions.| Period | 2 May 2023 |
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| Held at | Department of Philosophy |
