Description
Market Access, Political Connections, and Firm Performance Political connections are commonly recognized in shaping firm performance. Yet, how such political connection effects interact with regulation politics is not well understood. During 2015-2018, a wide-ranging policy reform was launched in China, which removed market access restrictions in non-sensitive business activities for all firms, offering a unique opportunity to investigate this question. This research constructs a dataset of China's publicly listed firms, measuring political connections based on directors' previous working expreinece as politicians. Politically connected firms are found to be more productive in China. I then exploit the variations in the timing of reform and the strength of firm-level political connections in a DID setup. The finding suggest that politically connected firms expereince adverse effects from the deregulation of market access, underscoring nuanced ways in which political connections interact with regulatory reforms. Further analyses will inverstigate the potential mechanisms underlying these effects.Period | 19 Apr 2024 |
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Event title | ECON Topic Defence Seminars |
Event type | Seminar |
Organiser | Department of Economics |
Location | Hong Kong, Hong KongShow on map |