Description
External world skepticism arises partly because we cannot rule out the skeptical hypothesis (e.g., I'm a brain in a vat), according to which we have the same experiences as we actually have but our beliefs about the external world are massively false. In this talk, I will present and defend Barry Stroud's response to skepticism. According to a Davidsonian thesis, we are unable to understand someone's beliefs about the external world unless we assume that most of her perceptual beliefs are true. Based on the Davidsonian thesis, Stroud argues that we cannot consistently consider or entertain the skeptical hypothesis. Therefore, we could never find ourselves confronted with the skeptic's challenge to our knowledge about the external world. I will respond to two objections to Stroud's argument: (i) Stroud's argument doesn't rule out the skeptical hypothesis; (ii) Stroud's argument doesn't provide epistemic justification for our external world beliefs. I will argue that the two objections are based on a misunderstanding of the anti-skeptical force of Stroud's argument. Stroud's argument can have anti-skeptical force only if we concede that we cannot rule out the skeptical hypothesis and cannot provide the justification required by the skeptic.Period | 2 May 2024 |
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Held at | Department of Philosophy |