Abstract
目前中国乘用车行业的反垄断调查涉及了包括零部件制造、销售流通及售后市场维修环节等在内的几乎整个产业链。然而对普遍存在的上下游纵向一体化关系和由此可能引发的横向共谋行为,调查并没有给予足够的重视。纵向一体化关系背后是跨国公司对乘用车核心技术和销售渠道的控制,这易于导致分享共同零配件供应商或者销售商的整车厂商的共谋。本文研究中国乘用车合资企业关键零部件的纵向一体化关系和企业之间的价格共谋行为。实证结果表明,同一外方母公司参股的企业,如果它们的关键零部件均由外方母公司纵向一体化供给,则它们之间存在价格共谋。这说明,现行的产业政策下,在合资企业中看似并不具有主导地位的外方,通过控制上游零配件厂商,同样影响了合资企业的定价行为和市场的竞争结构。
The ongoing anti-trust investigation in Chinese passenger-vehicle industry has involved the whole industry chain including components supply, sales and consumer service. However, the widespread vertical integration relationship and the horizontal collusion behavior that may arise have not received much attention yet. Behind the vertical integration relationship is the control on core technology or distribution network from foreign manufacturer, which will facilitate collusion between manufacturers that share a same supplier or dealer. This article analyzes vertical integration relationship of Chinese passenger-vehicle joint ventures and price collusion behavior between these firms. The empirical result shows that price collusion exists between two joint ventures with the same foreign parent whose key components are both supplied vertically by the foreign parent. Under the current industrial policy, although foreign parents seem not dominant in joint ventures, they still influence price behavior of joint ventures and the market structure through the control of upstream component suppliers.
The ongoing anti-trust investigation in Chinese passenger-vehicle industry has involved the whole industry chain including components supply, sales and consumer service. However, the widespread vertical integration relationship and the horizontal collusion behavior that may arise have not received much attention yet. Behind the vertical integration relationship is the control on core technology or distribution network from foreign manufacturer, which will facilitate collusion between manufacturers that share a same supplier or dealer. This article analyzes vertical integration relationship of Chinese passenger-vehicle joint ventures and price collusion behavior between these firms. The empirical result shows that price collusion exists between two joint ventures with the same foreign parent whose key components are both supplied vertically by the foreign parent. Under the current industrial policy, although foreign parents seem not dominant in joint ventures, they still influence price behavior of joint ventures and the market structure through the control of upstream component suppliers.
Original language | Chinese (Simplified) |
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Pages (from-to) | 1387-1408 |
Number of pages | 22 |
Journal | 经济学 (季刊) = China Economic Quarterly |
Volume | 15 |
Issue number | 4 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Jul 2016 |
Externally published | Yes |
Keywords
- 中国乘用车市场
- 纵向一体化
- 横向共谋
- Chinese Passenger-vehicle Industry
- Vertical Integration
- Horizontal Collusion