公立医院买方垄断对制药产业研发投入的影响 : 基于博弈模型的理论分析和实证检验: The impact of public hospitals' monopsony power on China's R and D input to pharmaceutical industry

刘旭宁, 臧旭恒, 林平

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)

Abstract

通过理论模型和计量检验,分析了医院在药品市场买方垄断地位对制药产业研发投入的影响作用。构建三阶段博弈模型,通过求解子博弈精炼纳什均衡证明了无论对于品牌药生产还是仿制药生产,打破医院买方垄断地位均有利于制药企业增强研发投入激励;并且当下游市场结构相同时,品牌药厂商比仿制药厂商更有激励从事工艺创新。面板数据计量检验证实了医院买方垄断格局与制药产业研发投入呈负相关关系。 Public hospitals have a monopsony on retail drug sales in China.With theoretical and empirical methods,this paper discusses the impact of public hospitals’ monopsony power on the RandD input to pharmaceutical industry.We try to model threestage games and the SPNEs indicate that public hospitals’ monoposony power in pharmaceutical market stifles pharmaceutical enterprises’ incentives to innovate,as to both brandname drugs and generic drugs.Facing same downstream market structure,the producer of brandname drugs has more incentive to innovate in process innovation than the one of generic drugs.We also examines the conclusion by using panel data.The findings of this paper provides a new perspective for the research on RandD activity of pharmaceutical industry.
Original languageChinese (Simplified)
Pages (from-to)47-53
Number of pages7
Journal山东大学学报 (哲学社会科学版) = Journal of Shandong University (Philosophy and Social Sciences)
Issue number6
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2012

Cite this

@article{3a1752f26f60463d9ae30c35d0777eb5,
title = "公立医院买方垄断对制药产业研发投入的影响 : 基于博弈模型的理论分析和实证检验: The impact of public hospitals' monopsony power on China's R and D input to pharmaceutical industry",
abstract = "通过理论模型和计量检验,分析了医院在药品市场买方垄断地位对制药产业研发投入的影响作用。构建三阶段博弈模型,通过求解子博弈精炼纳什均衡证明了无论对于品牌药生产还是仿制药生产,打破医院买方垄断地位均有利于制药企业增强研发投入激励;并且当下游市场结构相同时,品牌药厂商比仿制药厂商更有激励从事工艺创新。面板数据计量检验证实了医院买方垄断格局与制药产业研发投入呈负相关关系。 Public hospitals have a monopsony on retail drug sales in China.With theoretical and empirical methods,this paper discusses the impact of public hospitals’ monopsony power on the RandD input to pharmaceutical industry.We try to model threestage games and the SPNEs indicate that public hospitals’ monoposony power in pharmaceutical market stifles pharmaceutical enterprises’ incentives to innovate,as to both brandname drugs and generic drugs.Facing same downstream market structure,the producer of brandname drugs has more incentive to innovate in process innovation than the one of generic drugs.We also examines the conclusion by using panel data.The findings of this paper provides a new perspective for the research on RandD activity of pharmaceutical industry.",
author = "刘旭宁 and 臧旭恒 and 林平",
year = "2012",
month = "1",
day = "1",
language = "Chinese (Simplified)",
pages = "47--53",
journal = "山东大学学报 (哲学社会科学版) = Journal of Shandong University (Philosophy and Social Sciences)",
issn = "1001-9839",
number = "6",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - 公立医院买方垄断对制药产业研发投入的影响 : 基于博弈模型的理论分析和实证检验

T2 - The impact of public hospitals' monopsony power on China's R and D input to pharmaceutical industry

AU - 刘旭宁, null

AU - 臧旭恒, null

AU - 林平, null

PY - 2012/1/1

Y1 - 2012/1/1

N2 - 通过理论模型和计量检验,分析了医院在药品市场买方垄断地位对制药产业研发投入的影响作用。构建三阶段博弈模型,通过求解子博弈精炼纳什均衡证明了无论对于品牌药生产还是仿制药生产,打破医院买方垄断地位均有利于制药企业增强研发投入激励;并且当下游市场结构相同时,品牌药厂商比仿制药厂商更有激励从事工艺创新。面板数据计量检验证实了医院买方垄断格局与制药产业研发投入呈负相关关系。 Public hospitals have a monopsony on retail drug sales in China.With theoretical and empirical methods,this paper discusses the impact of public hospitals’ monopsony power on the RandD input to pharmaceutical industry.We try to model threestage games and the SPNEs indicate that public hospitals’ monoposony power in pharmaceutical market stifles pharmaceutical enterprises’ incentives to innovate,as to both brandname drugs and generic drugs.Facing same downstream market structure,the producer of brandname drugs has more incentive to innovate in process innovation than the one of generic drugs.We also examines the conclusion by using panel data.The findings of this paper provides a new perspective for the research on RandD activity of pharmaceutical industry.

AB - 通过理论模型和计量检验,分析了医院在药品市场买方垄断地位对制药产业研发投入的影响作用。构建三阶段博弈模型,通过求解子博弈精炼纳什均衡证明了无论对于品牌药生产还是仿制药生产,打破医院买方垄断地位均有利于制药企业增强研发投入激励;并且当下游市场结构相同时,品牌药厂商比仿制药厂商更有激励从事工艺创新。面板数据计量检验证实了医院买方垄断格局与制药产业研发投入呈负相关关系。 Public hospitals have a monopsony on retail drug sales in China.With theoretical and empirical methods,this paper discusses the impact of public hospitals’ monopsony power on the RandD input to pharmaceutical industry.We try to model threestage games and the SPNEs indicate that public hospitals’ monoposony power in pharmaceutical market stifles pharmaceutical enterprises’ incentives to innovate,as to both brandname drugs and generic drugs.Facing same downstream market structure,the producer of brandname drugs has more incentive to innovate in process innovation than the one of generic drugs.We also examines the conclusion by using panel data.The findings of this paper provides a new perspective for the research on RandD activity of pharmaceutical industry.

UR - http://commons.ln.edu.hk/sw_master/4206

M3 - Journal Article (refereed)

SP - 47

EP - 53

JO - 山东大学学报 (哲学社会科学版) = Journal of Shandong University (Philosophy and Social Sciences)

JF - 山东大学学报 (哲学社会科学版) = Journal of Shandong University (Philosophy and Social Sciences)

SN - 1001-9839

IS - 6

ER -