Abstract
针对由两竞争性处理商主导,涉及回收商和消费者的手机回收处理逆向供应链,构建四种不同回收渠道模式的Stackelberg博弈模型,分析各成员的最优决策,揭示渠道竞争程度、节约成本对处理商手机回收渠道决策的影响。针对市场机制作用和奖励政策影响,分别建立两处理商动态竞争的回收渠道决策演化博弈模型,得到相应的演化稳定策略。研究表明:两处理商均自建线上回收渠道时回收总量最大;若竞争程度较高而节约成本较低,处理商趋于选择传统回收渠道,而政府实施奖励政策可有效地促使处理商向自建线上回收渠道策略演化;若节约成本超过某一固定阈值,渠道竞争程度变化不影响处理商自建线上回收渠道的决策。
Considering the reverse supply chain of mobile phone recycling, which is dominated by two competitive processors and involves recyclers and consumers, this paper establishes the Stackelberg game models of four different recycling modes to analyze the optimal decision of each member, revealing the impacts of channel competition and cost saving on the processor’s decision of recycling channel. Then, aiming at the effects of market mechanism and government incentive policy, it respectively constructed the evolutionary game models of two processors with dynamic competition to obtain the evolutionarily stable strategies. Results show that the total recycling quantity is the largest when processors establish the online recycling channels. And processors will evolve to the traditional recycling channel when competition is intense but the cost saving is low. However, the incentive policy could encourage processors to choose their own online recycling channels. If the cost saving exceeds a certain threshold, the changes of competition degree will not affect the decision that processors establish the online recycling channels.
Considering the reverse supply chain of mobile phone recycling, which is dominated by two competitive processors and involves recyclers and consumers, this paper establishes the Stackelberg game models of four different recycling modes to analyze the optimal decision of each member, revealing the impacts of channel competition and cost saving on the processor’s decision of recycling channel. Then, aiming at the effects of market mechanism and government incentive policy, it respectively constructed the evolutionary game models of two processors with dynamic competition to obtain the evolutionarily stable strategies. Results show that the total recycling quantity is the largest when processors establish the online recycling channels. And processors will evolve to the traditional recycling channel when competition is intense but the cost saving is low. However, the incentive policy could encourage processors to choose their own online recycling channels. If the cost saving exceeds a certain threshold, the changes of competition degree will not affect the decision that processors establish the online recycling channels.
| Translated title of the contribution | Research on Evolutionary Game of Mobile Phone Recycling Channel Decision Dominated by Processor |
|---|---|
| Original language | Chinese (Simplified) |
| Pages (from-to) | 93-99 |
| Number of pages | 7 |
| Journal | 软科学 = Soft Science |
| Volume | 33 |
| Issue number | 10 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Oct 2019 |
| Externally published | Yes |
Bibliographical note
基金项目: 国家社会科学基金项目( 18BJY009) ; 国家自然科学基金青年项目( 71702129) ; 教育部人文社会科学研究基金项目( 17YJC630232) ; 天津市科技计划项目( 17ZLZXZF00030)Keywords
- 处理商主导
- 手机回收渠道决策
- 渠道竞争
- 节约成本
- 演化博弈
- processor dominance
- mobile phone recycling channel decision
- channel competition
- cost saving
- evolutionary game