委托代理关系下品牌商网络直播营销激励机制设计

数字经济的迅速发展促进了网络直播在营销中的广泛应用，越来越多的品牌商委托电商主播为其提供商品推荐服务。本文构建了单一品牌商与风险规避的电商主播构成的委托代理模型，其中品牌商与主播分别为委托方与代理方，通过求解不同信息状态下品牌商的最优激励合同以及主播的最优推荐努力水平，分析消费者偏好和主播推荐努力水平的信息价值，探究消费者偏好、主播的风险规避程度和市场需求的不确定性对最优合同的影响。结论表明：当主播的推荐努力水平可观测时，品牌商设计仅含直播佣金的最优激励合同，以获取主播的全部价值；当推荐努力水平不可观测时，最优激励合同包括直播佣金与收入分成两部分，此时风险规避程度的增大会降低主播的推荐努力水平，导致品牌商利润降低，从而降低最优激励合同中的收入分成。此外，不对称的消费者偏好信息在努力水平可观测时不影响品牌商利润，而在努力水平不可观测时可能增加品牌商利润，且具有努力水平信息优势的品牌商往往获利更多。

The rapid development of digital economy promotes the wide application of live streaming in network marketing in recent years. More and more brands entrust e-commerce influencers to provide product recommendation services for their online marketing. However, contracts between brands and e-commerce influencers are often different under complicatedmarket conditions. Firstly, there may be adverse selection problem, because of prior information asymmetry (e.g. consumers’ recommendation preference). Secondly, information asymmetry after the event will lead to moral hazard problems (e.g. influencers’ effort level). This paper builds a principal-agent model consisting of a brand and an online influencer with risk aversion, where the brand and influencer are the principal and agent respectively. By solving the optimal incentive contract of brand and the optimal effort level of influencer under different information status, we analyze consumers’ recommendation preference and information value of influencer’s recommendation effort level. Then we explore the impact of consumer’s recommendation preference, influencer’s risk aversion degree and uncertain market demand on the optimal contract. The results show that when the recommendation effort level is observable, the brand designs the optimal incentive contract with live streaming commission to get the whole value of the influencer. When the recommendation effort level is unobservable, the optimal incentive contract includes live streaming commission and revenue sharing fee. An increase in the risk aversion degree reduces the recommendation effort level, leading to lower profit of the brand, and thus reduces the revenue sharing fee in the optimal contract. In addition, the asymmetric information of consumers’ recommendation preference does not affect the brand’s profit when the effort level is observable, but increases the brand’s profit when the effort level is unobservable. Therefore, the brand who owns the information advantage of recommendation effort level tends to be more profitable. In all, our study provides a theoretical basis for brand’s contract design and e-commerce influencer’s recommendation effort strategy.