忠诚折扣的反垄断经济分析

历时近十年的欧盟诉英特尔案引发了关于忠诚折扣应该采用什么分析框架与测试方法的讨论。 一些学者认为忠诚折扣应该采用掠夺性定价的分析框架以及价格成本测试,另一些学者认为忠诚折扣应该采用独 家交易的分析框架,同时运用同等效率竞争者测试。 对于上述问题的回答需要明晰忠诚折扣背后的经济学逻辑。 以英特尔案为分析场景,本文剖析了忠诚折扣的竞争损害理论,通过对比分析掠夺性定价和独家交易的经济学逻 辑,发现忠诚折扣与独家交易应同属于提高对手成本的范畴。 据此,本文认为忠诚折扣应采用独家交易的分析框 架。 而且,由于价格低于成本既不是忠诚折扣的充分条件也不是其必要条件,因此,忠诚折扣应该采用更加合理的 同等效率竞争者测试,而非价格成本测试。<eng>The EU v. Intel case,which lasts for nearly a decade,sparks a discussion of what analytical framework and test methods should be used for loyalty discounts. Some scholars believe that loyalty discounts should use the analytical framework of predatory pricing and price cost testing,while others suggest that loyalty discounts should use an analytical framework for exclusive dealing with the equally efficient competitor test. The answer to the above questions needs to clarify the economic logic behind loyalty discounts. Taking the Intel case as the analysis scenario,this paper analyzes the theory of competitive damage of loyalty discounts. By comparing and analyzing the economic logic of predatory pricing and exclusive dealing,it is found that loyalty discounts and exclusive dealing should belong to the category of raising rivals’ costs. Therefore,loyalty discounts should adopt the analysis framework of exclusive dealing. Moreover,since the price below cost is neither a sufficient condition nor a necessary condition for loyalty discounts,loyalty discounts should be based on a more reasonable test,namely,the equally efficient competitor test rather than a price cost test.