政府為什么要放棄公司控制權?中國大宗股權轉讓中的不情愿和不情愿的私有化

從20世紀90年代后期開始,通過將上市公司的大宗股權轉讓 (block share transfer) 給國有的或私有的商業實體,政府放棄了對上市公司的控制。通過考察政府在將公司控制權轉讓給國有企業或私有實體時所考慮的排序名單,我們發現了某些政府不愿意私有化的跡象,即財政實力較弱的政府將績效較差的上市公司的控制權轉讓給私有實體。在將大宗股權轉讓給私有實體的過程中,地方政府官員對本地收購者也表現出較強的偏好。此外,以收購私人企業為目標的公司(privately-acquired target firms), 其收購后的績效狀況通常不如國有收購公司 (state-acquired firms)。我們的分析表明,收購前較差的公司績效、收購后更為嚴重的隧道行為 (tunneling behavior) 和更低的投資效率也許能夠說明以收購私人企業為目標的公司績效不佳的原因。我們的研究指出,對于中國這樣一個處在各種不同的制度約束下的轉型中的和發展中的國家而言,私有化在短期內可能并不會提高效率。

Starting from late 1990s, China's Governments gave up control over listed firms through block share transfers to state-owned and privately-owned business entities. By examining the priority list of governments in relinquishing corporate control power to state entities, we detect signs of reluctant privatization, i.e., governments with weaker fiscal capacity surrender control over more poorly-performing listed firms to a private entity. Regional government officials also exhibit stronger preferences to local acquires in block share transfers to private entities. Furthermore, privately-acquired target firms typically under-perform state-acquired ones in the post-acquisition period. Our analysis suggests that the weaker corporate performance before takeover, the more serious tunneling behavior and less efficient investment in the post-takeover period might account for under-performance of privately-acquired target firms. Our research points out that privatization might not be efficiency-enhancing in the short term under various institutional constraints in a transitioning and developing country like China.