电商自有品牌、制造商搭便车的e-供应链定价

考虑电商自有品牌商品进入引发的市场竞争，研究e-供应链定价与服务策略问题。针对三种销售模式，构建Stackelberg博弈模型研究e-供应链定价的最优均衡策略，分析了电商销售服务水平、制造商搭便车程度对e-供应链最优定价的影响规律，并提出e-供应链成员的最优销售模式。研究表明，当电商销售服务水平适中、两类品牌商品消费者感知差异大，或者销售服务水平低、两类品牌商品消费者感知差异小时，直销模式是电商、制造商的最优选择。随着服务水平提高，混销模式是制造商的最优选择；当销售服务水平低时，电商可提高销售服务水平、自有品牌商品价格，从而增加销售收益.当电商销售服务水平、制造商搭便车程度均较高时，在混销模式下电商、制造商的收益也较高。

Considering the market competition caused by the entry of e-commerce private brand commodity, this paper studies the pricing and service strategy of e-supply chain. Aiming at the three sales modes, this paper establishes a Stackelberg game model to study the optimal equilibrium strategy of e-supply chain pricing, and analyzes the influence rule of e-commerce sales service level and manufacturer’s free riding degree on the optimal pricing of e-supply chain, and proposes the optimal sales model of e-supply chain members. The results show that if the service level is moderate and the consumers’ brands difference is high, the direct selling mode is effective. If the service level is low and the consumers’ brands difference is small, the manufacturer will choose the direct selling mode, while the manufacturer should choose the hybrid selling mode as the service level is increasing. In addition, the e-commerce can raise the sales service level and private brand prices to increase sales revenue if the service level is low. The profits of e-commerce and manufacturer under the hybrid mode are also higher when the free-riding degree and the service level are higher.