碳奖励能否替代双积分? - 基于微分博弈的分析

聚焦双积分政策的衔接方案，构建了一个汽车双渠道供应链，采用微分博弈方法探讨了双积分政策、碳奖励政策、双积分和碳奖励政策组合情形下的动态最优决策。结果表明，在当前的双积分政策基础上实施碳奖励政策不会影响新能源汽车业务的资本积累及品牌汽车商誉。随着新能源汽车积分考核趋严，碳奖励政策对制造商和零售商决策的作用要高于双积分政策。双积分和碳奖励政策对制造商和零售商决策及利润的影响取决于不同的因素。碳奖励政策下制造商和零售商的利润稳态值要高于双积分政策。制造商和零售商利润在双积分和碳奖励政策下的平均差异率分别在6.997%～9.141%和0.040%～0.068%。本研究为推动双积分政策向碳排放管理政策转变提供了科学依据。

Focuses on the alternative options of the CAFC-NEV credits policy, constructs a dual-channel supply chain of automobiles, and discusses the dynamic optimal decision under the scenarios of the CAFC-NEV credits, carbon credit, and the combination of CAFC-NEV credits and carbon credit based on a differential game. The results indicate that the implementation of carbon credit on the basis of the current CAFC-NEV credits does not affect the capital accumulation of NEV and goodwill. As the assessment of CAFC-NEV credits become stricter, the impact of carbon credit on the the decisions of manufacturer and retailer is higher than that of CAFC-NEV credits. The impact of CAFC-NEV credits and carbon credit on the decisions and profits of manufacturer and retailer depends on different factors. The steady-state values of manufacturer and retailer profits are higher under the carbon