绿色采购下供应商的政策一致性: Dynamic consistence of supplier's policy in green supply chain

陈杰, 屠梅曾, 孙大宁

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

以博弈理论为工具,构造了绿色供应链环境下供需双方的单阶段博弈和重复博弈模型。模型分析表明,在单阶段博弈中,受利润最大化驱使的供应商必定会提供非绿色原料,从而实现低效率的均衡。在重复博弈中,长期利益对供应商的机会主义行为有制约作用,只要贴现因子满足一定条件,供应商就有积极性遵守提供绿色原料的诺言,最终实现经济与环保的"双赢"。 The game theory was utilized and one-stage game model and repeated game model were constructed. The models’ results show that powered by the economy benefit, the supplier will supply non-green raw material in one-stage game. As a result, the low efficient equilibrium is realized. In order to improve the efficiency of equilibrium, it is feasible to transfer one-stage game into repeated games. The long-term economy benefit will restrict the supplier’s opportunistic behavior in repeated games. As long as the discount factor can satisfy some condition, the supplier will conform its promise to supply green raw material, and the win-win of economy and environment protection will be realized.
Original languageChinese (Simplified)
Pages (from-to)463-465
Number of pages3
Journal上海交通大学学报 = Journal of Shanghai Jiaotong University
Volume38
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Mar 2004

Cite this

@article{bc3fb74124ce4729b6c09f469862e23e,
title = "绿色采购下供应商的政策一致性: Dynamic consistence of supplier's policy in green supply chain",
abstract = "以博弈理论为工具,构造了绿色供应链环境下供需双方的单阶段博弈和重复博弈模型。模型分析表明,在单阶段博弈中,受利润最大化驱使的供应商必定会提供非绿色原料,从而实现低效率的均衡。在重复博弈中,长期利益对供应商的机会主义行为有制约作用,只要贴现因子满足一定条件,供应商就有积极性遵守提供绿色原料的诺言,最终实现经济与环保的{"}双赢{"}。 The game theory was utilized and one-stage game model and repeated game model were constructed. The models’ results show that powered by the economy benefit, the supplier will supply non-green raw material in one-stage game. As a result, the low efficient equilibrium is realized. In order to improve the efficiency of equilibrium, it is feasible to transfer one-stage game into repeated games. The long-term economy benefit will restrict the supplier’s opportunistic behavior in repeated games. As long as the discount factor can satisfy some condition, the supplier will conform its promise to supply green raw material, and the win-win of economy and environment protection will be realized.",
author = "陈杰 and 屠梅曾 and 孙大宁",
year = "2004",
month = "3",
day = "1",
doi = "10.3321/j.issn:1006-2467.2004.03.034",
language = "Chinese (Simplified)",
volume = "38",
pages = "463--465",
journal = "Shanghai Jiaotong Daxue Xuebao/Journal of Shanghai Jiaotong University",
issn = "1006-2467",
publisher = "Shanghai Jiao Tong University",
number = "3",

}

绿色采购下供应商的政策一致性 : Dynamic consistence of supplier's policy in green supply chain. / 陈杰; 屠梅曾; 孙大宁.

In: 上海交通大学学报 = Journal of Shanghai Jiaotong University, Vol. 38, No. 3, 01.03.2004, p. 463-465.

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)

TY - JOUR

T1 - 绿色采购下供应商的政策一致性

T2 - Dynamic consistence of supplier's policy in green supply chain

AU - 陈杰, null

AU - 屠梅曾, null

AU - 孙大宁, null

PY - 2004/3/1

Y1 - 2004/3/1

N2 - 以博弈理论为工具,构造了绿色供应链环境下供需双方的单阶段博弈和重复博弈模型。模型分析表明,在单阶段博弈中,受利润最大化驱使的供应商必定会提供非绿色原料,从而实现低效率的均衡。在重复博弈中,长期利益对供应商的机会主义行为有制约作用,只要贴现因子满足一定条件,供应商就有积极性遵守提供绿色原料的诺言,最终实现经济与环保的"双赢"。 The game theory was utilized and one-stage game model and repeated game model were constructed. The models’ results show that powered by the economy benefit, the supplier will supply non-green raw material in one-stage game. As a result, the low efficient equilibrium is realized. In order to improve the efficiency of equilibrium, it is feasible to transfer one-stage game into repeated games. The long-term economy benefit will restrict the supplier’s opportunistic behavior in repeated games. As long as the discount factor can satisfy some condition, the supplier will conform its promise to supply green raw material, and the win-win of economy and environment protection will be realized.

AB - 以博弈理论为工具,构造了绿色供应链环境下供需双方的单阶段博弈和重复博弈模型。模型分析表明,在单阶段博弈中,受利润最大化驱使的供应商必定会提供非绿色原料,从而实现低效率的均衡。在重复博弈中,长期利益对供应商的机会主义行为有制约作用,只要贴现因子满足一定条件,供应商就有积极性遵守提供绿色原料的诺言,最终实现经济与环保的"双赢"。 The game theory was utilized and one-stage game model and repeated game model were constructed. The models’ results show that powered by the economy benefit, the supplier will supply non-green raw material in one-stage game. As a result, the low efficient equilibrium is realized. In order to improve the efficiency of equilibrium, it is feasible to transfer one-stage game into repeated games. The long-term economy benefit will restrict the supplier’s opportunistic behavior in repeated games. As long as the discount factor can satisfy some condition, the supplier will conform its promise to supply green raw material, and the win-win of economy and environment protection will be realized.

UR - http://commons.ln.edu.hk/sw_master/7143

U2 - 10.3321/j.issn:1006-2467.2004.03.034

DO - 10.3321/j.issn:1006-2467.2004.03.034

M3 - Journal Article (refereed)

VL - 38

SP - 463

EP - 465

JO - Shanghai Jiaotong Daxue Xuebao/Journal of Shanghai Jiaotong University

JF - Shanghai Jiaotong Daxue Xuebao/Journal of Shanghai Jiaotong University

SN - 1006-2467

IS - 3

ER -