董事会领导结构与公司治理：基于上市公司CEO更换的实证研究

缪柏其; 杨勇

doi:10.19616/j.cnki.bmj.2008.12.003

董事会领导结构与公司治理：基于上市公司CEO更换的实证研究

Translated title of the contribution: Board Leadership Structure and Corporate Governance: Evidence from CEO Turnovers in China’ s Listed Firms

缪柏其, 杨勇, 黄曼丽

Department of Finance and Insurance

Research output: Journal Publications › Journal Article (refereed) › peer-review

Abstract

本文研究了不同业绩水平下董事会领导结构与CEO更换之间的关系。研究发现，在业绩很好的公司中，CEO兼任董事长有利于避免不正常的CEO强制更换；在业绩一般的公司中，CEO兼任董事长则为业绩较低的CEO提供了保护；在经营亏损的公司中，这一保护不再发生作用。基于不同业绩水平下CEO更换的实质，本文认为，代理理论和现代管家理论在公司治理实践中是兼容的，从而为研究两者的关系提供了一个新的框架。此外，本文的研究还为我国的公司治理改革提供了一些有意义的启示。
This study examines how board leadership structure affects CEO turnovers when firms are experiencing different financial performance. It is shown that: (1) CEO duality protects CEO from the abnormal forced turnover in out-performing firms; (2) among average- performing firms, CEO duality entrenches CEOs from normal forced turnover; (3) there is no relationship between CEO duality and forced turnover in lose-making firms. Based on the different nature of CEO turnovers within different performance levels, this study provides a new framework which suggests that the agency theory and the stewardship theory of CEO duality are not mutually exclusive. We also try to give some suggestions on the ongoing corporate governance reform.

Translated title of the contribution	Board Leadership Structure and Corporate Governance: Evidence from CEO Turnovers in China’ s Listed Firms
Original language	Chinese (Simplified)
Pages (from-to)	10-16
Number of pages	7
Journal	经济管理 = Business Management Journal
Volume	30
Issue number	12
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.19616/j.cnki.bmj.2008.12.003
Publication status	Published - Jun 2008

Keywords

董事会领导结构
CEO更换
公司治理
代理理论
现代管家理论
Board leadership structure
CEO turnover
Corporate governance
Agency theory

Access to Document

10.19616/j.cnki.bmj.2008.12.003

https://tra.oversea.cnki.net/KCMS/detail/detail.aspx?dbcode=CJFD&dbname=CJFD2008&filename=JJGU200812004&uniplatform=NZKPT&v=IV9zI5SvVB7aTql5NvRiOYcSHbgg4vRecfNLvz3At0s8o7KCmn%25mmd2BCB7XvjCg1azAH

Cite this

@article{9bedecb08a6d43a08ebecf106d6e7367,

title = "董事会领导结构与公司治理：基于上市公司CEO更换的实证研究",

abstract = "本文研究了不同业绩水平下董事会领导结构与CEO更换之间的关系。研究发现，在业绩很好的公司中，CEO兼任董事长有利于避免不正常的CEO强制更换；在业绩一般的公司中，CEO兼任董事长则为业绩较低的CEO提供了保护；在经营亏损的公司中，这一保护不再发生作用。基于不同业绩水平下CEO更换的实质，本文认为，代理理论和现代管家理论在公司治理实践中是兼容的，从而为研究两者的关系提供了一个新的框架。此外，本文的研究还为我国的公司治理改革提供了一些有意义的启示。This study examines how board leadership structure affects CEO turnovers when firms are experiencing different financial performance. It is shown that: (1) CEO duality protects CEO from the abnormal forced turnover in out-performing firms; (2) among average- performing firms, CEO duality entrenches CEOs from normal forced turnover; (3) there is no relationship between CEO duality and forced turnover in lose-making firms. Based on the different nature of CEO turnovers within different performance levels, this study provides a new framework which suggests that the agency theory and the stewardship theory of CEO duality are not mutually exclusive. We also try to give some suggestions on the ongoing corporate governance reform.",

keywords = "董事会领导结构, CEO更换, 公司治理, 代理理论, 现代管家理论, Board leadership structure, CEO turnover, Corporate governance, Agency theory",

author = "缪柏其 and 杨勇 and 黄曼丽",

year = "2008",

month = jun,

doi = "10.19616/j.cnki.bmj.2008.12.003",

language = "Chinese (Simplified)",

volume = "30",

pages = "10--16",

journal = "经济管理 = Business Management Journal",

issn = "1002-5766",

number = "12",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - 董事会领导结构与公司治理：基于上市公司CEO更换的实证研究

AU - 缪柏其,

AU - 杨勇,

AU - 黄曼丽,

PY - 2008/6

Y1 - 2008/6

N2 - 本文研究了不同业绩水平下董事会领导结构与CEO更换之间的关系。研究发现，在业绩很好的公司中，CEO兼任董事长有利于避免不正常的CEO强制更换；在业绩一般的公司中，CEO兼任董事长则为业绩较低的CEO提供了保护；在经营亏损的公司中，这一保护不再发生作用。基于不同业绩水平下CEO更换的实质，本文认为，代理理论和现代管家理论在公司治理实践中是兼容的，从而为研究两者的关系提供了一个新的框架。此外，本文的研究还为我国的公司治理改革提供了一些有意义的启示。This study examines how board leadership structure affects CEO turnovers when firms are experiencing different financial performance. It is shown that: (1) CEO duality protects CEO from the abnormal forced turnover in out-performing firms; (2) among average- performing firms, CEO duality entrenches CEOs from normal forced turnover; (3) there is no relationship between CEO duality and forced turnover in lose-making firms. Based on the different nature of CEO turnovers within different performance levels, this study provides a new framework which suggests that the agency theory and the stewardship theory of CEO duality are not mutually exclusive. We also try to give some suggestions on the ongoing corporate governance reform.

AB - 本文研究了不同业绩水平下董事会领导结构与CEO更换之间的关系。研究发现，在业绩很好的公司中，CEO兼任董事长有利于避免不正常的CEO强制更换；在业绩一般的公司中，CEO兼任董事长则为业绩较低的CEO提供了保护；在经营亏损的公司中，这一保护不再发生作用。基于不同业绩水平下CEO更换的实质，本文认为，代理理论和现代管家理论在公司治理实践中是兼容的，从而为研究两者的关系提供了一个新的框架。此外，本文的研究还为我国的公司治理改革提供了一些有意义的启示。This study examines how board leadership structure affects CEO turnovers when firms are experiencing different financial performance. It is shown that: (1) CEO duality protects CEO from the abnormal forced turnover in out-performing firms; (2) among average- performing firms, CEO duality entrenches CEOs from normal forced turnover; (3) there is no relationship between CEO duality and forced turnover in lose-making firms. Based on the different nature of CEO turnovers within different performance levels, this study provides a new framework which suggests that the agency theory and the stewardship theory of CEO duality are not mutually exclusive. We also try to give some suggestions on the ongoing corporate governance reform.

KW - 董事会领导结构

KW - CEO更换

KW - 公司治理

KW - 代理理论

KW - 现代管家理论

KW - Board leadership structure

KW - CEO turnover

KW - Corporate governance

KW - Agency theory

U2 - 10.19616/j.cnki.bmj.2008.12.003

DO - 10.19616/j.cnki.bmj.2008.12.003

M3 - Journal Article (refereed)

SN - 1002-5766

VL - 30

SP - 10

EP - 16

JO - 经济管理 = Business Management Journal

JF - 经济管理 = Business Management Journal

IS - 12

ER -