银行贷款、商业信用融资及我国上市公司的公司治理

本文讨论了银行贷款以及商业信用融资对我 国上市公司公司治理的影响。通过对1995到2000年间 上市公司CEO更换的研究，我们得到两个结论：第一， 在经营业绩为负的公司中，银行贷款与强制性CEO更换 存在负向关系，而商业信用融资与强制性CEO更换存在 正向关系；第二，在盈利能力一般的公司中，商业信用 融资与强制性CEO更换仍为正向关系，但银行贷款与 强制性CEO更换却不存在明显的关系。以上结果表明， 商业信用融资在CEO强制性更换中起到了积极的作用， 改善了上市公司的公司治理，而银行贷款却没有起到相 应的作用，甚至有负面的作用。
Corporate finance theories suggest that creditors, including commercial banks and trade credit suppliers, have the incentive and capacity to discipline poorly performing managers. This study analyzes how bank borrowing and trade credit financing are related to forced turnover rate of the Chief Executive Officers in China listed firms. We achieve two major results: Among loss-making firms, there is a negative relationship between the amount of bank borrowing and the forced turnover rate; and a positive relation between the amount of trade credit financing and the forced turnover rate. Among firms with low profitability, we find a positive relationship between the amount of trade credit financing and the forced turnover rate; but no relationship between the amount of bank borrowing and the forced turnover rate. Our results suggest that state-owned banks perform a dysfunctional role and the trade credit suppliers perform a beneficial role in the corporate governance of China’s listed firms. Our findings on the dysfunctional roles of stateowned banks in corporate governance of China’s listed firms are consistent with the theoretical arguments that state-owned banks tend to have a weak incentive to exercise corporate controls owing to the political and private uses of banks by bureaucrats. Our results on the beneficial roles of trade credit suppliers are also consistent with theoretical arguments that trade credit suppliers have informational as well as incentive advantages over banks in serving as a monitoring agent even in an economy with weak legal protection for creditors.