We develop a general equilibrium model to study the implications of a legal environment on the organization of software production. We show that contract enforcement determines the organizational mode (i.e., in-house versus outsourcing) of customized software development while copyright protection affects both packaged software as well as customized software development. We obtain some testable results: when copyright protection is weak, only customized software will be developed; when copyright protection is strong, both customized software and packaged software will be developed; environment changes in one software market affect the equilibrium in the other software market.
|Number of pages||22|
|Journal||European Economic Review|
|Early online date||22 Sept 2005|
|Publication status||Published - Oct 2006|
Bibliographical noteFinancial support by a grant from HKUST (DAG03/04.BM28).
- Copyright protection
- Contract enforcement
- Vertical integration