A Methodological Argument Against Scientific Realism

Darrell Patrick ROWBOTTOM

doi:10.1007/s11229-019-02197-7

A Methodological Argument Against Scientific Realism

Darrell Patrick ROWBOTTOM

Department of Philosophy

Research output: Journal Publications › Journal Article (refereed) › peer-review

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

First, I identify a methodological thesis associated with scientific realism. This has different variants, but each concerns the reliability of scientific methods in connection with acquiring, or approaching, truth or approximate truth. Second, I show how this thesis bears on what scientists should do when considering new theories that significantly contradict older theories. Third, I explore how vulnerable scientific realism is to a reductio ad absurdum as a result. Finally, I consider which variants of the methodological thesis are the most defensible in light of the earlier findings.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	2153-2167
Number of pages	15
Journal	Synthese
Volume	198
Issue number	3
Early online date	8 Jun 2019
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02197-7
Publication status	Published - Mar 2021

Bibliographical note

This paper is based on talks given at Cambridge University’s Philosophy of Science Seminar and Durham University’s Institute of Advanced Study. I am grateful to various audience members for comments, and particularly Robin Hendry, Milena Ivanova, Brian Pitts, and Jacob Stegenga. I am greatly indebted to Simon Goldstein and Jiji Zhang for insightful comments on drafts of the paper.

Publisher Copyright:
© 2019, Springer Nature B.V.

Copyright:
Copyright 2021 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.

Keywords

Confirmation
Historical evidence
Scientific method
Scientific realism
Theory change

Access to Document

10.1007/s11229-019-02197-7

http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11229-019-02197-7

Cite this

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title = "A Methodological Argument Against Scientific Realism",

abstract = "First, I identify a methodological thesis associated with scientific realism. This has different variants, but each concerns the reliability of scientific methods in connection with acquiring, or approaching, truth or approximate truth. Second, I show how this thesis bears on what scientists should do when considering new theories that significantly contradict older theories. Third, I explore how vulnerable scientific realism is to a reductio ad absurdum as a result. Finally, I consider which variants of the methodological thesis are the most defensible in light of the earlier findings.",

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N2 - First, I identify a methodological thesis associated with scientific realism. This has different variants, but each concerns the reliability of scientific methods in connection with acquiring, or approaching, truth or approximate truth. Second, I show how this thesis bears on what scientists should do when considering new theories that significantly contradict older theories. Third, I explore how vulnerable scientific realism is to a reductio ad absurdum as a result. Finally, I consider which variants of the methodological thesis are the most defensible in light of the earlier findings.

AB - First, I identify a methodological thesis associated with scientific realism. This has different variants, but each concerns the reliability of scientific methods in connection with acquiring, or approaching, truth or approximate truth. Second, I show how this thesis bears on what scientists should do when considering new theories that significantly contradict older theories. Third, I explore how vulnerable scientific realism is to a reductio ad absurdum as a result. Finally, I consider which variants of the methodological thesis are the most defensible in light of the earlier findings.

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KW - Historical evidence

KW - Scientific method

KW - Scientific realism

KW - Theory change

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M3 - Journal Article (refereed)

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VL - 198

SP - 2153

EP - 2167

JO - Synthese

JF - Synthese

IS - 3

ER -

A Methodological Argument Against Scientific Realism

Abstract

Bibliographical note

Keywords

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Scientific realism : what it is, the contemporary debate, and new directions

The instrument of science : scientific anti-realism revitalised

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