A Novel Alternative Energy Trading Mechanism for Different Users Considering Value-Added Service and Price Competition

Yeming DAI*, Yuqing YANG, Mingming LENG

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)peer-review

4 Citations (Scopus)


In the context of integrated energy substitution and retail side liberalization, we develop a novel alternative energy trading mechanism in the presence of price competition and value-added service to study the purchase and sale strategies for integrated energy retailers. Under the mechanism, the retailer first joins a second-price sealed auction to make an optimal electricity purchase. If the retailer’s purchase bid fails, the retailer procures natural gas from a natural gas company to generate electricity. The retailer then sells the electricity to different users who buy according to their own types, which is modeled a leader-follower game for multiple retailers and classified users. Using a computational data, we design a distributed algorithm to solve the leader-follower game. The simulation results verify the convergence of proposed algorithm. Moreover, our sensitivity analysis indicates that the natural gas distribution rate and its conversion rate with respect to electricity are important to the power retailer’s profit in terms of energy loss rate and capacity rate. Compared with the non-demand response model, the novel alternative energy trading mechanism can help the power retailer reduce peaks and fill valleys to a certain extent, achieving an effective system balance of energy distribution and maximizing the power retailer’s profit and users’ utilities.
Original languageEnglish
Article number108531
Pages (from-to)108531
JournalComputers and Industrial Engineering
Early online date4 Aug 2022
Publication statusPublished - Oct 2022

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
We would like to thank the supports of the National Natural Science Foundation of China (No.72171126), Humanities and Social Science Fund of Ministry of Education of China (No.20YJA630009) and the Social Science Planning Project of Shandong Province (No.20CSDJ15). Faculty Research Grant of Lingnan University under the grant number DB21B1.

Publisher Copyright:
© 2022 Elsevier Ltd


  • alternative energy
  • price competition
  • user classification
  • Stackelberg equilibrium
  • added-value service
  • User classification
  • Price competition
  • Alternative energy
  • Added-value service


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