Abstract
This paper develops a reputation strategic model of monetary policy with a continuous finite or infinite time horizon. By using the optimal stopping theory and introducing the notions of sequentially weak and strong rational expectation equilibria, we show that the time inconsistency problem may be solved with trigger reputation strategies not only for stochastic but also for non-stochastic settings even with a finite horizon. We show the existence of stationary sequentially strong rational expectation equilibrium under some condition, and there always exists a stationary sequentially weak rational expectation equilibrium. Moreover, we investigate the robustness of the sequentially strong rational expectation equilibrium behavior solution by showing that the imposed assumption is reasonable.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 523-533 |
Number of pages | 11 |
Journal | Journal of Macroeconomics |
Volume | 31 |
Issue number | 4 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 1 Dec 2009 |
Externally published | Yes |
Funding
We wish to thank two anonymous referees for helpful comments and suggestions that improved the exposition of the paper. The second author thanks the National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC-70773073) and the Program to Enhance Scholarly and Creative Activities at Texas A&M University as well as from Cheung Kong Scholars Program at the Ministry of Education of China for financial support.
Keywords
- Continuous model
- Monetary policy
- Reputation
- Time consistency problem