A Temporal Comparison Argument for Presentism


*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)peer-review


Presentism is the thesis that every existing thing presently exists. This paper presents a novel argument for presentism, which is based on the role `presently' plays in making comparisons between what is the case and what was or will be the case. A number of responses to this argument are discussed and it is argued that each of these responses is unsuccessful.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)182-215
Number of pages34
JournalPhilosophical Perspectives
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - Dec 2022

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
Past versions of this paper were presented at the 2008 Blackwood Postgraduate conference, the University of Sydney current projects seminar series in Sept 2009, the 2018 IAPT conference, and the Lingnan/HKU/NUS seminar series in Dec 2021. This paper benefitted from valuable discussion with many people, including Antony Eagle, Alistair Wilson, Kristie Miller, Michael Raven, Richard Parris, Dana Goswick and the audiences of the above talks.


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