A Temporal Comparison Argument for Presentism

Dan MARSHALL

doi:10.1111/phpe.12173

A Temporal Comparison Argument for Presentism

Dan MARSHALL^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Lingnan University

Research output: Journal Publications › Journal Article (refereed) › peer-review

Abstract

Presentism is the thesis that every existing thing presently exists. This paper presents a novel argument for presentism, which is based on the role `presently' plays in making comparisons between what is the case and what was or will be the case. A number of responses to this argument are discussed and it is argued that each of these responses is unsuccessful.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	182-215
Number of pages	34
Journal	Philosophical Perspectives
Volume	36
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/phpe.12173
Publication status	Published - Dec 2022

Bibliographical note

Past versions of this paper were presented at the 2008 Blackwood Postgraduate conference, the University of Sydney current projects seminar series in Sept 2009, the 2018 IAPT conference, and the Lingnan/HKU/NUS seminar series in Dec 2021. This paper benefitted from valuable discussion with many people, including Antony Eagle, Alistair Wilson, Kristie Miller, Michael Raven, Richard Parris, Dana Goswick and the audiences of the above talks.

Access to Document

10.1111/phpe.12173

Cite this

@article{9058f889adc743da828c3c1ee3ee56b0,

title = "A Temporal Comparison Argument for Presentism",

abstract = "Presentism is the thesis that every existing thing presently exists. This paper presents a novel argument for presentism, which is based on the role `presently' plays in making comparisons between what is the case and what was or will be the case. A number of responses to this argument are discussed and it is argued that each of these responses is unsuccessful.",

author = "Dan MARSHALL",

note = "Past versions of this paper were presented at the 2008 Blackwood Postgraduate conference, the University of Sydney current projects seminar series in Sept 2009, the 2018 IAPT conference, and the Lingnan/HKU/NUS seminar series in Dec 2021. This paper benefitted from valuable discussion with many people, including Antony Eagle, Alistair Wilson, Kristie Miller, Michael Raven, Richard Parris, Dana Goswick and the audiences of the above talks.",

year = "2022",

month = dec,

doi = "10.1111/phpe.12173",

language = "English",

volume = "36",

pages = "182--215",

journal = "Philosophical Perspectives",

issn = "1520-8583",

publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell Publishing Ltd",

number = "1",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - A Temporal Comparison Argument for Presentism

AU - MARSHALL, Dan

N1 - Past versions of this paper were presented at the 2008 Blackwood Postgraduate conference, the University of Sydney current projects seminar series in Sept 2009, the 2018 IAPT conference, and the Lingnan/HKU/NUS seminar series in Dec 2021. This paper benefitted from valuable discussion with many people, including Antony Eagle, Alistair Wilson, Kristie Miller, Michael Raven, Richard Parris, Dana Goswick and the audiences of the above talks.

PY - 2022/12

Y1 - 2022/12

N2 - Presentism is the thesis that every existing thing presently exists. This paper presents a novel argument for presentism, which is based on the role `presently' plays in making comparisons between what is the case and what was or will be the case. A number of responses to this argument are discussed and it is argued that each of these responses is unsuccessful.

AB - Presentism is the thesis that every existing thing presently exists. This paper presents a novel argument for presentism, which is based on the role `presently' plays in making comparisons between what is the case and what was or will be the case. A number of responses to this argument are discussed and it is argued that each of these responses is unsuccessful.

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85146068521

U2 - 10.1111/phpe.12173

DO - 10.1111/phpe.12173

M3 - Journal Article (refereed)

SN - 1520-8583

VL - 36

SP - 182

EP - 215

JO - Philosophical Perspectives

JF - Philosophical Perspectives

IS - 1

ER -

A Temporal Comparison Argument for Presentism

Abstract

Bibliographical note

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Cite this