A Theory of Conditional Assertion

Simon David GOLDSTEIN

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)

Abstract

According to one tradition, uttering an indicative conditional involves performing a special sort of speech act: a conditional assertion. We introduce a formal framework that models this speech act. Using this framework, we show that any theory of conditional assertion validates several inferences in the logic of conditionals, including the False Antecedent inference (that not A implies if A, then C). Next, we determine the space of truth conditional semantics for conditionals consistent with conditional assertion. The truth value of any such conditional is settled whenever the antecedent is false, and whenever the antecedent is true and the consequent is false. Then, we consider the space of dynamic meanings consistent with the theory of conditional assertion. We develop a new family of dynamic conditional assertion operators that combine a traditional test operator with an update operation.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)293-318
Number of pages26
JournalJournal of Philosophy
Volume116
Issue number6
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jun 2019

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Bibliographical note

This research was supported by Research Grants Council Grant #23602118

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