Actual vs. counterfactual dispositional metasemantics : a reply to Andow

Michael JOHNSON, Jennifer Ellen NADO

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)Researchpeer-review

Abstract

In previous work (Johnson and Nado 2014) we proposed a sketch of a disposition-based metasemantictheory, which has recently been criticized by James Andow (2016). Andow claims, first, that our dispositionalmetasemantics threatens to render the meanings of our words indeterminate, and second, that our viewrisks a 'semantic apocalypse' according to which most of our terms fail to refer. We respond to Andow'scriticism by modifying and expanding our orignial, underspecified view. In particular, we propose that a viewthat appeals to actual dispositions rather than counterfactual dispositions avoids many difficulties that might confront a disposition-based metasemantics - issues even beyond those that Andow raises.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)717-734
Number of pages18
JournalPhilosophia : Philosophical Quarterly of Israel
Volume45
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jun 2017

Fingerprint

Disposition
Apocalypse
Indeterminate
Render

Keywords

  • Dispositions
  • Metasemantics
  • Philosophy of language

Cite this

JOHNSON, Michael ; NADO, Jennifer Ellen. / Actual vs. counterfactual dispositional metasemantics : a reply to Andow. In: Philosophia : Philosophical Quarterly of Israel. 2017 ; Vol. 45, No. 2. pp. 717-734.
@article{044016bf119d412fb107ddbded526610,
title = "Actual vs. counterfactual dispositional metasemantics : a reply to Andow",
abstract = "In previous work (Johnson and Nado 2014) we proposed a sketch of a disposition-based metasemantictheory, which has recently been criticized by James Andow (2016). Andow claims, first, that our dispositionalmetasemantics threatens to render the meanings of our words indeterminate, and second, that our viewrisks a 'semantic apocalypse' according to which most of our terms fail to refer. We respond to Andow'scriticism by modifying and expanding our orignial, underspecified view. In particular, we propose that a viewthat appeals to actual dispositions rather than counterfactual dispositions avoids many difficulties that might confront a disposition-based metasemantics - issues even beyond those that Andow raises.",
keywords = "Dispositions, Metasemantics, Philosophy of language",
author = "Michael JOHNSON and NADO, {Jennifer Ellen}",
year = "2017",
month = "6",
day = "1",
doi = "10.1007/s11406-017-9840-1",
language = "English",
volume = "45",
pages = "717--734",
journal = "Philosophia : Philosophical Quarterly of Israel",
issn = "0048-3893",
number = "2",

}

Actual vs. counterfactual dispositional metasemantics : a reply to Andow. / JOHNSON, Michael; NADO, Jennifer Ellen.

In: Philosophia : Philosophical Quarterly of Israel, Vol. 45, No. 2, 01.06.2017, p. 717-734.

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)Researchpeer-review

TY - JOUR

T1 - Actual vs. counterfactual dispositional metasemantics : a reply to Andow

AU - JOHNSON, Michael

AU - NADO, Jennifer Ellen

PY - 2017/6/1

Y1 - 2017/6/1

N2 - In previous work (Johnson and Nado 2014) we proposed a sketch of a disposition-based metasemantictheory, which has recently been criticized by James Andow (2016). Andow claims, first, that our dispositionalmetasemantics threatens to render the meanings of our words indeterminate, and second, that our viewrisks a 'semantic apocalypse' according to which most of our terms fail to refer. We respond to Andow'scriticism by modifying and expanding our orignial, underspecified view. In particular, we propose that a viewthat appeals to actual dispositions rather than counterfactual dispositions avoids many difficulties that might confront a disposition-based metasemantics - issues even beyond those that Andow raises.

AB - In previous work (Johnson and Nado 2014) we proposed a sketch of a disposition-based metasemantictheory, which has recently been criticized by James Andow (2016). Andow claims, first, that our dispositionalmetasemantics threatens to render the meanings of our words indeterminate, and second, that our viewrisks a 'semantic apocalypse' according to which most of our terms fail to refer. We respond to Andow'scriticism by modifying and expanding our orignial, underspecified view. In particular, we propose that a viewthat appeals to actual dispositions rather than counterfactual dispositions avoids many difficulties that might confront a disposition-based metasemantics - issues even beyond those that Andow raises.

KW - Dispositions

KW - Metasemantics

KW - Philosophy of language

UR - http://commons.ln.edu.hk/sw_master/6714

U2 - 10.1007/s11406-017-9840-1

DO - 10.1007/s11406-017-9840-1

M3 - Journal Article (refereed)

VL - 45

SP - 717

EP - 734

JO - Philosophia : Philosophical Quarterly of Israel

JF - Philosophia : Philosophical Quarterly of Israel

SN - 0048-3893

IS - 2

ER -