Against Epistemic Accounts of Luck

Jesse HILL*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)peer-review


Epistemic accounts of luck define luck’s chanciness condition relative to a subject’s epistemic position. This could be put in terms of a subject’s evidenceor knowledgeabout whether the event will occur. I argue that both versions of the epistemic account fail. In §1, I give two types of counterexamples to the evidence-based approach. In §2, I argue—contrary to the knowledge-based view—that an event can be a matter of good or bad luck for a subject even if she knows that it will occur. In §3, I argue that epistemic accounts cannot explain some instances of constitutive luck. Because of these problems, luck’s chanciness condition cannot be adequately defined in epistemic terms.
Original languageEnglish
Article numberanad013
Pages (from-to)474-482
Number of pages9
Issue number3
Early online date17 Jun 2023
Publication statusPublished - Jul 2023


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