Akrasia and the problem of the unity of reason

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Joseph Raz and Sergio Tenenbaum argue that the Guise of the Good thesis explains both the possibility of practical reason and its unity with theoretical reason, something Humean psychological theories may be unable to do. This paper will argue, however, that Raz and Tenenbaum face a dilemma: either the version of the Guise of the Good they offer is too strong to allow for weakness of will, or it will lose its theoretical advantage in preserving the unity of reason.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)65-80
Number of pages16
JournalRatio
Volume28
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Mar 2015

Fingerprint

Unity
Akrasia
Weakness of Will
Practical Reason
Joseph Raz
David Hume
Theoretical Reason
Psychological Theory

Cite this

@article{05aad7bde8a74ef9a2204a559e2e2098,
title = "Akrasia and the problem of the unity of reason",
abstract = "Joseph Raz and Sergio Tenenbaum argue that the Guise of the Good thesis explains both the possibility of practical reason and its unity with theoretical reason, something Humean psychological theories may be unable to do. This paper will argue, however, that Raz and Tenenbaum face a dilemma: either the version of the Guise of the Good they offer is too strong to allow for weakness of will, or it will lose its theoretical advantage in preserving the unity of reason.",
author = "BAKER, {Derek Clayton}",
year = "2015",
month = "3",
day = "1",
doi = "10.1111/rati.12066",
language = "English",
volume = "28",
pages = "65--80",
journal = "Ratio",
issn = "0034-0006",
publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell Publishing Ltd",
number = "1",

}

Akrasia and the problem of the unity of reason. / BAKER, Derek Clayton.

In: Ratio, Vol. 28, No. 1, 01.03.2015, p. 65-80.

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)

TY - JOUR

T1 - Akrasia and the problem of the unity of reason

AU - BAKER, Derek Clayton

PY - 2015/3/1

Y1 - 2015/3/1

N2 - Joseph Raz and Sergio Tenenbaum argue that the Guise of the Good thesis explains both the possibility of practical reason and its unity with theoretical reason, something Humean psychological theories may be unable to do. This paper will argue, however, that Raz and Tenenbaum face a dilemma: either the version of the Guise of the Good they offer is too strong to allow for weakness of will, or it will lose its theoretical advantage in preserving the unity of reason.

AB - Joseph Raz and Sergio Tenenbaum argue that the Guise of the Good thesis explains both the possibility of practical reason and its unity with theoretical reason, something Humean psychological theories may be unable to do. This paper will argue, however, that Raz and Tenenbaum face a dilemma: either the version of the Guise of the Good they offer is too strong to allow for weakness of will, or it will lose its theoretical advantage in preserving the unity of reason.

UR - http://commons.ln.edu.hk/sw_master/3021

U2 - 10.1111/rati.12066

DO - 10.1111/rati.12066

M3 - Journal Article (refereed)

VL - 28

SP - 65

EP - 80

JO - Ratio

JF - Ratio

SN - 0034-0006

IS - 1

ER -