Akrasia and the problem of the unity of reason

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)peer-review

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Joseph Raz and Sergio Tenenbaum argue that the Guise of the Good thesis explains both the possibility of practical reason and its unity with theoretical reason, something Humean psychological theories may be unable to do. This paper will argue, however, that Raz and Tenenbaum face a dilemma: either the version of the Guise of the Good they offer is too strong to allow for weakness of will, or it will lose its theoretical advantage in preserving the unity of reason.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)65-80
Number of pages16
JournalRatio
Volume28
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Mar 2015

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Akrasia and the problem of the unity of reason'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this