An alternative account of epistemic reasons for action : in response to Booth

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)Researchpeer-review

Abstract

In a recent contribution to Grazer Philosophische Studien, Booth argues that for S to have an epistemic reason to ψ means that if S ψ's then he will have more true beliefs and less false beliefs than if he does not ψ. After strengthening this external account in response to the objection that one can improve one's epistemic state in other fashions, e.g. by having a gain in true beliefs which outweighs one's gain in false beliefs, I provide a challenge to it. My main objection, which I advance with the aid of several examples, is that such epistemic reasons could not motivate any action whatsoever. I close by developing an alternative account, which avoids this problem by appeal to internal considerations.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)191-198
Number of pages8
JournalGrazer Philosophische Studien
Volume76
Publication statusPublished - 1 Aug 2008
Externally publishedYes

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Reasons for Action
False Belief
Epistemic States
Strengthening

Cite this

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abstract = "In a recent contribution to Grazer Philosophische Studien, Booth argues that for S to have an epistemic reason to ψ means that if S ψ's then he will have more true beliefs and less false beliefs than if he does not ψ. After strengthening this external account in response to the objection that one can improve one's epistemic state in other fashions, e.g. by having a gain in true beliefs which outweighs one's gain in false beliefs, I provide a challenge to it. My main objection, which I advance with the aid of several examples, is that such epistemic reasons could not motivate any action whatsoever. I close by developing an alternative account, which avoids this problem by appeal to internal considerations.",
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An alternative account of epistemic reasons for action : in response to Booth. / ROWBOTTOM, Darrell Patrick.

In: Grazer Philosophische Studien, Vol. 76, 01.08.2008, p. 191-198.

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)Researchpeer-review

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