An analysis of intrinsicality

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)peer-review

11 Citations (Scopus)


The leading account of intrinsicality over the last thirty years has arguably been David Lewis's account in terms of perfect naturalness. Lewis's account, however, has three serious problems: i) it cannot allow necessarily coextensive properties to differ in whether they are intrinsic; ii) it falsely classifies non-qualitative properties like being Obama as non-intrinsic; and iii) it is incompatible with a number of metaphysical theories that posit irreducibly non-categorical properties. I argue that, as a result of these problems, Lewis's account should be rejected and replaced with an alternative account, which also analyses intrinsicality in terms of perfect naturalness, but which avoids these problems.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)704-739
Number of pages36
Issue number4
Early online date5 Feb 2015
Publication statusPublished - Dec 2016


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