Abstract
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Place of Publication | Massachusetts |
| Publisher | National Bureau of Economic Research |
| Number of pages | 64 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Feb 2016 |
| Externally published | Yes |
Publication series
| Name | NBER Working Paper Series |
|---|---|
| Publisher | National Bureau of Economic Research |
| No. | 22001 |
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Bibliographical note
Presented at Stigler Center for the Study of Economy and the State (Chicago Booth, Dec 2016), The 2nd China-Europe Conference: Transparency Economic Institutions and Governance (2016), The 2016 Greater China Area Finance Conference, the ABFER 2016, NBER’s May 2015 China Economy workshop, CJAR (2014), and the HKMA (2014).Cite this
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Anti-corruption reforms and shareholder valuations : event study evidence from China. / LIN, Chen; MORCK, Randall; YEUNG, Bernard; ZHAO, Xiaofeng.
Massachusetts : National Bureau of Economic Research, 2016. (NBER Working Paper Series; No. 22001).Research output: Working paper › Working paper series
TY - UNPB
T1 - Anti-corruption reforms and shareholder valuations : event study evidence from China
AU - LIN, Chen
AU - MORCK, Randall
AU - YEUNG, Bernard
AU - ZHAO, Xiaofeng
N1 - Presented at Stigler Center for the Study of Economy and the State (Chicago Booth, Dec 2016), The 2nd China-Europe Conference: Transparency Economic Institutions and Governance (2016), The 2016 Greater China Area Finance Conference, the ABFER 2016, NBER’s May 2015 China Economy workshop, CJAR (2014), and the HKMA (2014).
PY - 2016/2
Y1 - 2016/2
N2 - Consistent with reduced expected corruption adding value overall, Chinese shares rise sharply on the December 4th 2012 launch of major anti-corruption reforms, which started by curtailing extravagant spending by or for Party cadres. SOEs gain broadly, consistent with the reform cutting their top managers’ (all Party cadres) spending on private benefits. NonSOEs gain in more liberalized provinces, consistent with reduced expected bribes to officials (also Party cadres) for getting business done. NonSOEs lose in provinces where market institutions remain weak, consistent with bribes for “greasing bureaucratic gears” still being a key resource allocation mechanism there. Firm level regressions reveal more productive nonSOEs in more growth potential and external finance-dependent industries gaining more in more liberalized provinces, consistent with investors expecting reduced corruption to complement and perhaps intensify the development of market institutions.
AB - Consistent with reduced expected corruption adding value overall, Chinese shares rise sharply on the December 4th 2012 launch of major anti-corruption reforms, which started by curtailing extravagant spending by or for Party cadres. SOEs gain broadly, consistent with the reform cutting their top managers’ (all Party cadres) spending on private benefits. NonSOEs gain in more liberalized provinces, consistent with reduced expected bribes to officials (also Party cadres) for getting business done. NonSOEs lose in provinces where market institutions remain weak, consistent with bribes for “greasing bureaucratic gears” still being a key resource allocation mechanism there. Firm level regressions reveal more productive nonSOEs in more growth potential and external finance-dependent industries gaining more in more liberalized provinces, consistent with investors expecting reduced corruption to complement and perhaps intensify the development of market institutions.
U2 - 10.3386/w22001
DO - 10.3386/w22001
M3 - Working paper series
T3 - NBER Working Paper Series
BT - Anti-corruption reforms and shareholder valuations : event study evidence from China
PB - National Bureau of Economic Research
CY - Massachusetts
ER -