Abstract
In summer 1997, the high-performing East and South-east Asian economies faced a financial crisis of unprecedented proportions. In a matter of weeks, once-vibrant economies and their strong currencies witnessed a meltdown, forcing them to turn to that lender of last resort, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), for assistance. A careful examination of the long-term as well as the immediate causes of the crisis refutes the widely held view that no one predicted the crisis. The crisis could have been avoided if the over-exuberant Asian governments had heeded the IMF's early warning. The IMF's policy prescriptions are not only working, but those states in the region that follow them will do best.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 27-52 |
| Number of pages | 26 |
| Journal | Survival |
| Volume | 40 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 1 Jan 1998 |
| Externally published | Yes |