TY - JOUR
T1 - Attraction, Aversion, and Asymmetrical Desires
AU - PALLIES, Daniel
N1 - Many thanks to the many people who provided very helpful feedback on various versions of this article. In particular, I thank Mark Schroeder, Ralph Wedgwood, Janet Levin,John Hawthorne, Uriah Kriegel, Jennifer Foster, Alexander Dietz, two anonymous reviewers, and two associate editors at Ethics.
PY - 2022/4
Y1 - 2022/4
N2 - I argue that, insofar as we endorse the general idea that desires play an important role in well-being, we ought to believe that their significance for well-being is derived from a pair of more fundamental attitudes: attraction and aversion. Attraction has wholly positive significance for well-being, and aversion has wholly negative significance for well-being. Desire satisfaction and frustration have significance for wellbeing insofar as the relevant desires involve some combination of attraction and aversion. I defend these claims by illustrating how our desires can be asymmetrical. They can have greater positive than negative significance for well-being, or vice versa.
AB - I argue that, insofar as we endorse the general idea that desires play an important role in well-being, we ought to believe that their significance for well-being is derived from a pair of more fundamental attitudes: attraction and aversion. Attraction has wholly positive significance for well-being, and aversion has wholly negative significance for well-being. Desire satisfaction and frustration have significance for wellbeing insofar as the relevant desires involve some combination of attraction and aversion. I defend these claims by illustrating how our desires can be asymmetrical. They can have greater positive than negative significance for well-being, or vice versa.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85126664618&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1086/718083
DO - 10.1086/718083
M3 - Journal Article (refereed)
AN - SCOPUS:85126664618
SN - 0014-1704
VL - 132
SP - 598
EP - 620
JO - Ethics
JF - Ethics
IS - 3
ER -