Auditors' reporting conservatism after regulatory sanctions : evidence from China

Michael A. FIRTH, Phyllis Lai Lan MO, Raymond M. K. WONG

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)Researchpeer-review

7 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This study examines whether regulatory sanctions have a disciplinary effect on auditors in a large emerging market. Based on the enforcement releases issued by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) during 1996-2007, we hypothesize and find that auditors who are sanctioned for failure to detect and report financial statement fraud report more conservatively after the sanction. Our empirical findings specifically suggest that sanctioned auditors issue more going-concern opinions for risky clients after enforcement action than they did before the enforcement action. In contrast, we find no such effect for non-risky clients. Overall, we provide evidence that regulatory sanctions are effective in shaping auditors' behavior when they audit risky clients.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1-24
Number of pages24
JournalJournal of International Accounting Research
Volume13
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2014

Fingerprint

Sanctions
China
Conservatism
Auditors
Enforcement
Financial statement fraud
Audit
Going concern opinion
Emerging markets

Bibliographical note

Raymond Wong acknowledges the financial support of a grant from the Research Grants Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China (Project No. CityU 152012).

Keywords

  • audit risk
  • auditors' reporting conservatism
  • going-concern opinions
  • modified audit opinions
  • regulatory sanctions

Cite this

FIRTH, Michael A. ; MO, Phyllis Lai Lan ; WONG, Raymond M. K. / Auditors' reporting conservatism after regulatory sanctions : evidence from China. In: Journal of International Accounting Research. 2014 ; Vol. 13, No. 2. pp. 1-24.
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Auditors' reporting conservatism after regulatory sanctions : evidence from China. / FIRTH, Michael A.; MO, Phyllis Lai Lan; WONG, Raymond M. K.

In: Journal of International Accounting Research, Vol. 13, No. 2, 2014, p. 1-24.

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)Researchpeer-review

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