Axiological pessimism, procreation and collective responsibility

Andrea SAUCHELLI

doi:10.1111/phpr.70015

Axiological pessimism, procreation and collective responsibility

Andrea SAUCHELLI^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Journal Publications › Journal Article (refereed) › peer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

A form of pessimism can support the claim that we have a collective duty to prevent the creation of additional human beings. More specifically, I argue that axiological pessimism, which suggests that human existence is overall bad (for humans) because of a form of evil it causes, implies that we should end human procreation, provided that we do not thereby generate further such evil. In turn, this conclusion can support anti-natalism, the normative view that we should refrain from procreating.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	157-172
Number of pages	16
Journal	Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Volume	111
Issue number	1
Early online date	19 May 2025
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70015
Publication status	Published - Jul 2025

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2025 The Author(s). Philosophy and Phenomenological Research published by Wiley Periodicals LLC on behalf of Philosophy and Phenomenological Research LLC.

Funding

Research Grants Council, University Grants Committee (GrantNumber(s): 13607023; Grant recipient(s): Andrea Sauchelli)

Keywords

Philosophical pessimism
badness of existence
value asymmetry
anti-natalism
collective responsibility
value of humanity
philosophical pessimism

UN SDGs

This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

Access to Document

10.1111/phpr.70015Licence: CC BY-NC

Cite this

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abstract = "A form of pessimism can support the claim that we have a collective duty to prevent the creation of additional human beings. More specifically, I argue that axiological pessimism, which suggests that human existence is overall bad (for humans) because of a form of evil it causes, implies that we should end human procreation, provided that we do not thereby generate further such evil. In turn, this conclusion can support anti-natalism, the normative view that we should refrain from procreating.",

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KW - collective responsibility

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Axiological pessimism, procreation and collective responsibility

Abstract

Bibliographical note

Funding

Keywords

UN SDGs

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Survival, Value and Existential Risk: Foundational Issues (關於倖存，價值和生存風險的基本議題)

Cite this

Axiological pessimism, procreation and collective responsibility

Abstract

Bibliographical note

Funding

Keywords

UN SDGs

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Projects

Survival, Value and Existential Risk: Foundational Issues (關於倖存，價值和生存風險的基本議題)

Cite this