Axiological pessimism, procreation and collective responsibility

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)peer-review

Abstract

A form of pessimism can support the claim that we have a collective duty to prevent the creation of additional human beings. More specifically, I argue that axiological pessimism, which suggests that human existence is overall bad (for humans) because of a form of evil it causes, implies that we should end human procreation, provided that we do not thereby generate further such evil. In turn, this conclusion can support anti-natalism, the normative view that we should refrain from procreating.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)157-172
Number of pages16
JournalPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research
Volume111
Issue number1
Early online date19 May 2025
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jul 2025

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2025 The Author(s). Philosophy and Phenomenological Research published by Wiley Periodicals LLC on behalf of Philosophy and Phenomenological Research LLC.

Funding

Research Grants Council, University Grants Committee (GrantNumber(s): 13607023; Grant recipient(s): Andrea Sauchelli)

UN SDGs

This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

  1. SDG 3 - Good Health and Well-being
    SDG 3 Good Health and Well-being
  2. SDG 10 - Reduced Inequalities
    SDG 10 Reduced Inequalities
  3. SDG 12 - Responsible Consumption and Production
    SDG 12 Responsible Consumption and Production

Keywords

  • philosophical pessimism
  • badness of existence
  • value asymmetry
  • anti-natalism
  • collective responsibility
  • value of humanity

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