Believing epistemic contradictions

Bob BEDDOR, Simon David GOLDSTEIN

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)Researchpeer-review

1 Scopus Citations

Abstract

What is it to believe something might be the case? We develop a puzzle that creates difficulties for standard answers to this question. We go on to propose our own solution, which integrates a Bayesian approach to belief with a dynamic semantics for epistemic modals. After showing how our account solves the puzzle, we explore a surprising consequence: virtually all of our beliefs about what might be the case provide counterexamples to the view that rational belief is closed under logical implication.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)87-114
Number of pages28
JournalThe Review of Symbolic Logic
Volume11
Issue number1
Early online date8 Aug 2017
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Mar 2018

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Counterexample
Dynamic Semantics
Logic
Epistemic Modals

Keywords

  • belief reports
  • dynamic semantics
  • phrasesepistemic modals
  • probability

Cite this

BEDDOR, Bob ; GOLDSTEIN, Simon David. / Believing epistemic contradictions. In: The Review of Symbolic Logic. 2018 ; Vol. 11, No. 1. pp. 87-114.
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Believing epistemic contradictions. / BEDDOR, Bob; GOLDSTEIN, Simon David.

In: The Review of Symbolic Logic, Vol. 11, No. 1, 03.2018, p. 87-114.

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)Researchpeer-review

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