Believing epistemic contradictions

Bob BEDDOR, Simon David GOLDSTEIN

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)

7 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

What is it to believe something might be the case? We develop a puzzle that creates difficulties for standard answers to this question. We go on to propose our own solution, which integrates a Bayesian approach to belief with a dynamic semantics for epistemic modals. After showing how our account solves the puzzle, we explore a surprising consequence: virtually all of our beliefs about what might be the case provide counterexamples to the view that rational belief is closed under logical implication.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)87-114
Number of pages28
JournalThe Review of Symbolic Logic
Volume11
Issue number1
Early online date8 Aug 2017
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Mar 2018

Keywords

  • belief reports
  • dynamic semantics
  • phrasesepistemic modals
  • probability

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