Believing epistemic contradictions

Bob BEDDOR; Simon David GOLDSTEIN

doi:10.1017/S1755020316000514

Believing epistemic contradictions

Bob BEDDOR
, Simon David GOLDSTEIN

Department of Philosophy

Research output: Journal Publications › Journal Article (refereed) › peer-review

25 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

What is it to believe something might be the case? We develop a puzzle that creates difficulties for standard answers to this question. We go on to propose our own solution, which integrates a Bayesian approach to belief with a dynamic semantics for epistemic modals. After showing how our account solves the puzzle, we explore a surprising consequence: virtually all of our beliefs about what might be the case provide counterexamples to the view that rational belief is closed under logical implication.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	87-114
Number of pages	28
Journal	The Review of Symbolic Logic
Volume	11
Issue number	1
Early online date	8 Aug 2017
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755020316000514
Publication status	Published - Mar 2018

Keywords

belief reports
dynamic semantics
phrasesepistemic modals
probability

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10.1017/S1755020316000514

https://acuresearchbank.acu.edu.au/download/65629128068718dbfccdab6560aa73b9a7ae1a8c83ba82ed31394dbde61dd4a1/381450/AM_Beddor_2017_Believing_epistemic_contradictions.pd.pdfLicence: CC BY-NC-ND

Cite this

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KW - phrasesepistemic modals

KW - probability

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85027076297

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Believing epistemic contradictions

Abstract

Keywords

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