Book Review : Beliefs, delusions, and dry-functionalism

Kengo Miyazono, in his work Delusions and Beliefs, defends a teleo-functional account of delusions. In my contribution to this symposium, I question one of Miyazono’s motivations for appealing to teleo-functionalism over its main rival, dry-functionalism. Miyazono suggests that teleo-functionalism, unlike dry-functionalism, can account for the compatibility of the theses (i) that delusions are genuine doxastic states (doxasticism about delusions) and (ii) that delusions do not perform the typical causal roles of beliefs (the causal difference thesis). I argue, however, that there are also ways for dry-functionalism to account for this compatibility. If what I have to say is correct, then Miyazono is perhaps too hasty—at least in one important respect—to opt for teleo-functionalism over dry-functionalism. Dry-functionalism has an equally good chance of satisfying some of Miyazono’s explanatory goals.