Buyback Contract and Price Postponement in a Decentralized Supply Chain with Additive and Price-Dependent Demand

    Research output: Other Conference ContributionsPresentationPresentation

    Abstract

    We study a decentralized supply chain with one supplier offering buyback contract to one retailer who postpones retail pricing decision after demand realization. We find some mild conditions on demand distribution that guarantee the existence of a unique equilibrium when demand is additive in uncertainty. We discuss the impact of buyback contract on operational decisions and supply chain performance. Different from the game with multiplicative demand, the equilibrium buyback ratio, profit allocation ratio between supply chain members and the channel efficiency depend on demand distribution.
    Original languageEnglish
    Publication statusPublished - 15 Jul 2014
    Event20th Conference of the International Federation of Operational Research Societies - Barcelona International Convention Center, Barcelona, Spain
    Duration: 13 Jul 201418 Jul 2014
    http://www.ifors2014.org/

    Conference

    Conference20th Conference of the International Federation of Operational Research Societies
    CountrySpain
    CityBarcelona
    Period13/07/1418/07/14
    Internet address

    Fingerprint

    Postponement
    Price-dependent demand
    Decentralized supply chain
    Buy-back contract
    Buyback
    Supply chain performance
    Pricing decisions
    Suppliers
    Guarantee
    Retail pricing
    Retailers
    Uncertainty
    Profit
    Supply chain

    Cite this

    SHANG, W. (2014). Buyback Contract and Price Postponement in a Decentralized Supply Chain with Additive and Price-Dependent Demand. 20th Conference of the International Federation of Operational Research Societies, Barcelona, Spain.
    SHANG, Weixin. / Buyback Contract and Price Postponement in a Decentralized Supply Chain with Additive and Price-Dependent Demand. 20th Conference of the International Federation of Operational Research Societies, Barcelona, Spain.
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    abstract = "We study a decentralized supply chain with one supplier offering buyback contract to one retailer who postpones retail pricing decision after demand realization. We find some mild conditions on demand distribution that guarantee the existence of a unique equilibrium when demand is additive in uncertainty. We discuss the impact of buyback contract on operational decisions and supply chain performance. Different from the game with multiplicative demand, the equilibrium buyback ratio, profit allocation ratio between supply chain members and the channel efficiency depend on demand distribution.",
    author = "Weixin SHANG",
    year = "2014",
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    language = "English",
    note = "20th Conference of the International Federation of Operational Research Societies ; Conference date: 13-07-2014 Through 18-07-2014",
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    SHANG, W 2014, 'Buyback Contract and Price Postponement in a Decentralized Supply Chain with Additive and Price-Dependent Demand' 20th Conference of the International Federation of Operational Research Societies, Barcelona, Spain, 13/07/14 - 18/07/14, .

    Buyback Contract and Price Postponement in a Decentralized Supply Chain with Additive and Price-Dependent Demand. / SHANG, Weixin.

    2014. 20th Conference of the International Federation of Operational Research Societies, Barcelona, Spain.

    Research output: Other Conference ContributionsPresentationPresentation

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    N2 - We study a decentralized supply chain with one supplier offering buyback contract to one retailer who postpones retail pricing decision after demand realization. We find some mild conditions on demand distribution that guarantee the existence of a unique equilibrium when demand is additive in uncertainty. We discuss the impact of buyback contract on operational decisions and supply chain performance. Different from the game with multiplicative demand, the equilibrium buyback ratio, profit allocation ratio between supply chain members and the channel efficiency depend on demand distribution.

    AB - We study a decentralized supply chain with one supplier offering buyback contract to one retailer who postpones retail pricing decision after demand realization. We find some mild conditions on demand distribution that guarantee the existence of a unique equilibrium when demand is additive in uncertainty. We discuss the impact of buyback contract on operational decisions and supply chain performance. Different from the game with multiplicative demand, the equilibrium buyback ratio, profit allocation ratio between supply chain members and the channel efficiency depend on demand distribution.

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    ER -

    SHANG W. Buyback Contract and Price Postponement in a Decentralized Supply Chain with Additive and Price-Dependent Demand. 2014. 20th Conference of the International Federation of Operational Research Societies, Barcelona, Spain.