TY - JOUR
T1 - Can ‘intrinsic’ be defined using only broadly logical notions?
AU - MARSHALL, Daniel Graham
PY - 2009/5/1
Y1 - 2009/5/1
N2 - An intrinsic property is roughly a property things have in virtue of how they are, as opposed to how they are related to things outside of them. This paper argues that it is not possible to give a definition of ‘intrinsic’ that involves only logical, modal and mereological notions, and does not depend on any special assumptions about either properties or possible worlds.
AB - An intrinsic property is roughly a property things have in virtue of how they are, as opposed to how they are related to things outside of them. This paper argues that it is not possible to give a definition of ‘intrinsic’ that involves only logical, modal and mereological notions, and does not depend on any special assumptions about either properties or possible worlds.
UR - http://commons.ln.edu.hk/sw_master/2461
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=65649088316&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2009.00259.x
DO - 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2009.00259.x
M3 - Journal Article (refereed)
SN - 0031-8205
VL - 78
SP - 646
EP - 672
JO - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
JF - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
IS - 3
ER -