Can ‘intrinsic’ be defined using only broadly logical notions?

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)peer-review

20 Citations (Scopus)


An intrinsic property is roughly a property things have in virtue of how they are, as opposed to how they are related to things outside of them. This paper argues that it is not possible to give a definition of ‘intrinsic’ that involves only logical, modal and mereological notions, and does not depend on any special assumptions about either properties or possible worlds.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)646-672
Number of pages27
JournalPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research
Issue number3
Publication statusPublished - 1 May 2009
Externally publishedYes


Dive into the research topics of 'Can ‘intrinsic’ be defined using only broadly logical notions?'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this