Can ‘intrinsic’ be defined using only broadly logical notions?

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)

11 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

An intrinsic property is roughly a property things have in virtue of how they are, as opposed to how they are related to things outside of them. This paper argues that it is not possible to give a definition of ‘intrinsic’ that involves only logical, modal and mereological notions, and does not depend on any special assumptions about either properties or possible worlds.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)646-672
Number of pages27
JournalPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research
Volume78
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 May 2009
Externally publishedYes

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Intrinsic
Logic
Intrinsic Properties
Possible Worlds

Cite this

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title = "Can ‘intrinsic’ be defined using only broadly logical notions?",
abstract = "An intrinsic property is roughly a property things have in virtue of how they are, as opposed to how they are related to things outside of them. This paper argues that it is not possible to give a definition of ‘intrinsic’ that involves only logical, modal and mereological notions, and does not depend on any special assumptions about either properties or possible worlds.",
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Can ‘intrinsic’ be defined using only broadly logical notions? / MARSHALL, Daniel Graham.

In: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 78, No. 3, 01.05.2009, p. 646-672.

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)

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AB - An intrinsic property is roughly a property things have in virtue of how they are, as opposed to how they are related to things outside of them. This paper argues that it is not possible to give a definition of ‘intrinsic’ that involves only logical, modal and mereological notions, and does not depend on any special assumptions about either properties or possible worlds.

UR - http://commons.ln.edu.hk/sw_master/2461

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JO - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

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