Can Modal Skepticism Defeat Humean Skepticism?

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Abstract

My topic is moderate modal skepticism in the spirit of Peter van Inwagen. Here understood, this is a conservative version of modal empiricism that severely limits the extent to which an ordinary agent can reasonably believe “exotic” possibility claims. I offer a novel argument in support of this brand of skepticism: modal skepticism grounds an attractive (and novel) reply to Humean skepticism. Thus, I propose that modal skepticism be accepted on the basis of its theoretical utility as a tool for dissolving philosophical paradox.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationModal Epistemology After Rationalism
EditorsFelipe LEON, Bob FISCHER
PublisherSpringer
Pages281-308
Number of pages28
ISBN (Electronic)9783319443096
ISBN (Print)9783319443072
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2017
Externally publishedYes

Publication series

NameSynthese Library
Volume378

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