China’s Anti-Monopoly Law and the role of economics in its enforcement

Heng JU, Ping LIN

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)peer-review

6 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

China has made significant achievements in enforcing its 2008 Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) during the past twelve years. We review the application of economics by the China’s competition law enforcers and courts in dealing with antitrust cases. We discuss selected cases to illustrate the application of the relevant theories of competition harms. While the use of economics in its AML enforcement is consistent with international best practice, China can benefit from further raising the deterrence effect of the AML, increasing enforcement resources, and enhancing its cost-effectiveness of its Fair Competition Review system.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)219-238
Number of pages20
JournalRussian Journal of Economics
Volume6
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 25 Sept 2020

Keywords

  • China’s Anti-Monopoly Law
  • theories of harms
  • administrative monopolies
  • Theories of harms
  • Administrative monopolies
  • China's Anti-Monopoly Law

Cite this