Competition and coordination in a fashion supply chain with wholesale pricing schemes

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32 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This chapter considers a two-echelon supply chain where a supplier determines his production quantity and a retailer chooses her order size and retail price for each period in an infinite horizon. Under a price-discount sharing (PDS) scheme, the supplier’s wholesale price linearly depends on the retail price. We develop a stochastic game in which these two supply chain members maximize their discounted profits. We show that a unique Nash equilibrium solution exists for each period, and over the infinite horizon the supplier chooses a stationary base stock policy whereas the retailer’s equilibrium solution could be non-stationary. Next, we investigate the problem of whether or not a wholesale pricing scheme can coordinate the supplier and the retailer, and derive the conditions for supply chain coordination. Moreover, we use Nash arbitration scheme to allocate the system-wide profit between the supplier and the retailer.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationFashion supply chain management : industry and business analysis
PublisherBusiness Science Reference
Pages42-73
Number of pages32
ISBN (Print)9781609607562
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Oct 2012

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