Concrete possible worlds and counterfactual conditionals : Lewis vs. Williamson on modal knowledge

Andrea SAUCHELLI

doi:10.1007/s11229-009-9571-3

Concrete possible worlds and counterfactual conditionals : Lewis vs. Williamson on modal knowledge

Andrea SAUCHELLI

Research output: Journal Publications › Journal Article (refereed) › peer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The epistemology of modality is gradually coming to play a central role in general discussions about modality. This paper is a contribution in this direction, in particular I draw a comparison between Lewis’s Modal realism and Timothy Williamson’s recent account of modality in terms of counterfactual thinking. In order to have criteria of evaluation, I also formulate four requirements which are supposed to be met by any theory of modality to be epistemologically adequate.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	345-359
Number of pages	15
Journal	Synthese
Volume	176
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9571-3
Publication status	Published - 1 Oct 2010
Externally published	Yes

Keywords

Counterfactual thinking
Modal epistemology
Modality
Possible worlds

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10.1007/s11229-009-9571-3

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AB - The epistemology of modality is gradually coming to play a central role in general discussions about modality. This paper is a contribution in this direction, in particular I draw a comparison between Lewis’s Modal realism and Timothy Williamson’s recent account of modality in terms of counterfactual thinking. In order to have criteria of evaluation, I also formulate four requirements which are supposed to be met by any theory of modality to be epistemologically adequate.

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KW - Modal epistemology

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Concrete possible worlds and counterfactual conditionals : Lewis vs. Williamson on modal knowledge

Abstract

Keywords

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