Concrete possible worlds and counterfactual conditionals : Lewis vs. Williamson on modal knowledge

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)Researchpeer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The epistemology of modality is gradually coming to play a central role in general discussions about modality. This paper is a contribution in this direction, in particular I draw a comparison between Lewis’s Modal realism and Timothy Williamson’s recent account of modality in terms of counterfactual thinking. In order to have criteria of evaluation, I also formulate four requirements which are supposed to be met by any theory of modality to be epistemologically adequate.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)345-359
Number of pages15
JournalSynthese
Volume176
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Oct 2010
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

realism
epistemology
evaluation
Counterfactual Conditionals
Modality
Possible Worlds

Keywords

  • Counterfactual thinking
  • Modal epistemology
  • Modality
  • Possible worlds

Cite this

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Concrete possible worlds and counterfactual conditionals : Lewis vs. Williamson on modal knowledge. / SAUCHELLI, Andrea.

In: Synthese, Vol. 176, No. 3, 01.10.2010, p. 345-359.

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)Researchpeer-review

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