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Cooperation or not? Strategic responses to imbalance pricing under multi-source uncertainty

  • Rongqing YIN
  • , Yeming DAI*
  • , Mingming LENG
  • *Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Journal Publications › Journal Article (refereed) › peer-review

Abstract

With growing variable renewable energy (VRE), electricity markets face supply–demand balancing under multi-source uncertainty, including generation fluctuations, supply interruptions, and load variability. Under imbalance pricing, decentralized decisions by a variable renewable energy generator (VREG) and an electricity retailer (ER) can amplify deviations and increase imbalance settlement costs. To examine the effectiveness of strategic coordination, we develop two-stage game-theoretic models for the day-ahead and real-time markets under single imbalance pricing, comparing a non-cooperative mechanism with a cooperative mechanism. Forecast deviations are represented by a symmetric Beta distribution so that prediction accuracy can be varied and analyzed systematically. The results show that the cooperative mechanism improves overall market performance: it increases supply-side profits and user welfare (thus raising social welfare) and reduces deviations and the likelihood of extreme imbalance settlements. At the same time, although the cooperative mechanism increases retail price volatility, it lowers the expected retail price and raises expected consumption relative to the non-cooperative mechanism. Moreover, cooperation weakens—but does not eliminate—the VREG’s incentive to improve forecasting accuracy, because risk sharing lowers the marginal gain from additional accuracy improvements. A case study using data from Germany during the December 2024 “Dunkelflaute” shows that cooperation increases expected coalition profit by 3.4% while substantially mitigating extreme-loss risk. Finally, extensions with incomplete demand response and a flexible power generator (FPG) capacity constraint suggest that, under more realistic demand-side and flexibility limitations, the original model may underestimate the value of the cooperative mechanism.
Original languageEnglish
Article number103567
JournalOmega
Volume143
Early online date7 Apr 2026
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Sept 2026

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2026 Elsevier Ltd

Funding

This work was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 72371139), the General Research Fund (GRF) of the Hong Kong Research Grants Council (No. LU13500025).

UN SDGs

This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

  1. SDG 7 - Affordable and Clean Energy
    SDG 7 Affordable and Clean Energy

Keywords

  • Multi-source uncertainties
  • Imbalance pricing
  • Stackelberg game
  • Cournot game
  • Cooperative game
  • Shapley value

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