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Abstract
With growing variable renewable energy (VRE), electricity markets face supply–demand balancing under multi-source uncertainty, including generation fluctuations, supply interruptions, and load variability. Under imbalance pricing, decentralized decisions by a variable renewable energy generator (VREG) and an electricity retailer (ER) can amplify deviations and increase imbalance settlement costs. To examine the effectiveness of strategic coordination, we develop two-stage game-theoretic models for the day-ahead and real-time markets under single imbalance pricing, comparing a non-cooperative mechanism with a cooperative mechanism. Forecast deviations are represented by a symmetric Beta distribution so that prediction accuracy can be varied and analyzed systematically. The results show that the cooperative mechanism improves overall market performance: it increases supply-side profits and user welfare (thus raising social welfare) and reduces deviations and the likelihood of extreme imbalance settlements. At the same time, although the cooperative mechanism increases retail price volatility, it lowers the expected retail price and raises expected consumption relative to the non-cooperative mechanism. Moreover, cooperation weakens—but does not eliminate—the VREG’s incentive to improve forecasting accuracy, because risk sharing lowers the marginal gain from additional accuracy improvements. A case study using data from Germany during the December 2024 “Dunkelflaute” shows that cooperation increases expected coalition profit by 3.4% while substantially mitigating extreme-loss risk. Finally, extensions with incomplete demand response and a flexible power generator (FPG) capacity constraint suggest that, under more realistic demand-side and flexibility limitations, the original model may underestimate the value of the cooperative mechanism.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Article number | 103567 |
| Journal | Omega |
| Volume | 143 |
| Early online date | 7 Apr 2026 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Sept 2026 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© 2026 Elsevier Ltd
Funding
This work was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 72371139), the General Research Fund (GRF) of the Hong Kong Research Grants Council (No. LU13500025).
UN SDGs
This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
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SDG 7 Affordable and Clean Energy
Keywords
- Multi-source uncertainties
- Imbalance pricing
- Stackelberg game
- Cournot game
- Cooperative game
- Shapley value
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Dive into the research topics of 'Cooperation or not? Strategic responses to imbalance pricing under multi-source uncertainty'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.Projects
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Optimal Pricing Decisions and Recommendation Strategies in Online Marketplaces with Consumers' Strategic Search Behaviors (考虑消费者战略搜索行为的在线市场最优定价决策和推荐策略)
LENG, M. (PI) & SOŠIĆ, G. (CoI)
Research Grants Council (Hong Kong, China)
1/01/26 → 31/12/27
Project: Grant Research
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