Abstract
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 393-404 |
| Number of pages | 12 |
| Journal | European Journal of Operational Research |
| Volume | 232 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| Early online date | 22 Jul 2013 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 16 Jan 2014 |
Fingerprint
Keywords
- Retail space-exchange
- Bargaining power
- Generalized Nash bargaining scheme
- Weighted Shapley value
Cite this
}
Cooperative game analysis of retail space-exchange problems. / LENG, Mingming; PARLAR, Mahmut; ZHANG, Dengfeng.
In: European Journal of Operational Research, Vol. 232, No. 2, 16.01.2014, p. 393-404.Research output: Journal Publications › Journal Article (refereed)
TY - JOUR
T1 - Cooperative game analysis of retail space-exchange problems
AU - LENG, Mingming
AU - PARLAR, Mahmut
AU - ZHANG, Dengfeng
PY - 2014/1/16
Y1 - 2014/1/16
N2 - We analyze retail space-exchange problems where two or more retailers exchange their excess retail spaces to improve the utilization of their space resource. We first investigate the two-retailer space exchange problem. In order to entice both retailers with different bargaining powers to exchange their spaces, we use the generalized Nash bargaining scheme to allocate the total profit surplus between the two retailers. Next, we consider the space-exchange problem involving three or more retailers, and construct a cooperative game in characteristic function form. We show that the game is essential and superadditive, and also prove that the core is non-empty. Moreover, in order to find a unique allocation scheme that ensures the stability of the grand coalition, we propose a new approach to compute a weighted Shapley value that satisfies the core conditions and also reflects retailers’ bargaining powers. Our analysis indicates that the space exchange by more retailers can result in a higher system-wide profit surplus and thus a higher allocation to each retailer under a fair scheme.
AB - We analyze retail space-exchange problems where two or more retailers exchange their excess retail spaces to improve the utilization of their space resource. We first investigate the two-retailer space exchange problem. In order to entice both retailers with different bargaining powers to exchange their spaces, we use the generalized Nash bargaining scheme to allocate the total profit surplus between the two retailers. Next, we consider the space-exchange problem involving three or more retailers, and construct a cooperative game in characteristic function form. We show that the game is essential and superadditive, and also prove that the core is non-empty. Moreover, in order to find a unique allocation scheme that ensures the stability of the grand coalition, we propose a new approach to compute a weighted Shapley value that satisfies the core conditions and also reflects retailers’ bargaining powers. Our analysis indicates that the space exchange by more retailers can result in a higher system-wide profit surplus and thus a higher allocation to each retailer under a fair scheme.
KW - Retail space-exchange
KW - Bargaining power
KW - Generalized Nash bargaining scheme
KW - Weighted Shapley value
UR - http://commons.ln.edu.hk/sw_master/1605
UR - https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-84883755100&doi=10.1016%2fj.ejor.2013.07.013&partnerID=40&md5=4694edcc295bc9eb615bd625e09da651
U2 - 10.1016/j.ejor.2013.07.013
DO - 10.1016/j.ejor.2013.07.013
M3 - Journal Article (refereed)
VL - 232
SP - 393
EP - 404
JO - European Journal of Operational Research
JF - European Journal of Operational Research
SN - 0377-2217
IS - 2
ER -