Corporate ownership structure and bank loan syndicate structure

Chen LIN, Yue MA, Paul MALATESTA, Yuhai XUAN

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)

59 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Using a novel data set on corporate ownership and control, we show that the divergence between the control rights and cash-flow rights of a borrowing firm's largest ultimate owner has a significant impact on the concentration and composition of the firm's loan syndicate. When the control-ownership divergence is large, lead arrangers form syndicates with structures that facilitate enhanced due diligence and monitoring efforts. These syndicates tend to be relatively concentrated and composed of domestic banks that are geographically close to the borrowing firms and that have lending expertise related to the industries of the borrowers. We also examine factors that influence the relation between ownership structure and syndicate structure, including lead arranger reputation, prior lending relationship, borrowing firm informational opacity, presence of multiple large owners, laws and institutions, and financial crises.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1-22
Number of pages22
JournalJournal of Financial Economics
Volume104
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Apr 2012

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Keywords

  • Excess control rights
  • Ownership structure
  • Syndicated loans

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