TY - JOUR
T1 - Corporate visibility and executive pay
AU - RAYTON, Bruce A.
AU - BRAMMER, Stephen
AU - CHENG, Lai Sheung, Suwina
PY - 2012/10/1
Y1 - 2012/10/1
N2 - This paper seeks evidence of implicit regulation of executive pay. The implicit regulation hypothesis suggests highly visible companies will constrain their behavior to avoid potential reprisals from constituents, politicians and potential regulators. We extend this literature using a measure of corporate visibility based on the number of news stories about each firm in a balanced panel of 242 public companies.
AB - This paper seeks evidence of implicit regulation of executive pay. The implicit regulation hypothesis suggests highly visible companies will constrain their behavior to avoid potential reprisals from constituents, politicians and potential regulators. We extend this literature using a measure of corporate visibility based on the number of news stories about each firm in a balanced panel of 242 public companies.
KW - Visibility; Incentive pay; Implicit regulation
UR - http://commons.ln.edu.hk/sw_master/1556
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84862596882&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.05.044
DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.05.044
M3 - Journal Article (refereed)
SN - 0165-1765
VL - 117
SP - 337
EP - 339
JO - Economics Letters
JF - Economics Letters
IS - 1
ER -