Corporate visibility and executive pay

Bruce A. RAYTON, Stephen BRAMMER, Lai Sheung, Suwina CHENG

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)

1 Scopus Citations

Abstract

This paper seeks evidence of implicit regulation of executive pay. The implicit regulation hypothesis suggests highly visible companies will constrain their behavior to avoid potential reprisals from constituents, politicians and potential regulators. We extend this literature using a measure of corporate visibility based on the number of news stories about each firm in a balanced panel of 242 public companies.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)337-339
Number of pages3
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume117
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Oct 2012

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Keywords

  • Visibility; Incentive pay; Implicit regulation

Cite this

RAYTON, B. A., BRAMMER, S., & CHENG, L. S. S. (2012). Corporate visibility and executive pay. Economics Letters, 117(1), 337-339. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2012.05.044