Abstract
This paper argues that Duhem’s thesis does not decisively refute a corroboration-based account of scientific methodology (or ‘falsificationism’), but instead that auxiliary hypotheses are themselves subject to measurements of corroboration which can be used to inform practice. It argues that a corroboration-based account is equal to the popular Bayesian alternative, which has received much more recent attention, in this respect.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 139-149 |
Number of pages | 11 |
Journal | Synthese |
Volume | 177 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 1 Nov 2010 |
Externally published | Yes |
Bibliographical note
I am grateful to Gunnar Andersson, Peter Baumann, and two anonymous referees for comments on earlier versions of this paper.Funding
I should also like to thank the British Academy for supporting this research by way of a Postdoctoral Research Fellowship.
Keywords
- Confirmation
- Corroboration
- Duhem's thesis
- Falsificationism
- Popper
- Quine-Duhem thesis