Cost of government and firm value

Michael FIRTH, Stephen X. GONG, Liwei SHAN

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)Researchpeer-review

19 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Do high expenditures incurred in running the government benefit or hurt firms? Using Chinese data between 1999 and 2006, we find that higher administrative expenditures in provincial governments are associated with lower firm value, lower stock and financial performance, and lower labor productivity. Local governments that spend more on public administration tend to collect more fees from companies and spend less on social welfare and infrastructures. Our evidence is consistent with the “grabbing hand” hypothesis and has important policy implications.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)136-152
Number of pages17
JournalJournal of Corporate Finance
Volume21
Early online date26 Jan 2013
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jun 2013

Fingerprint

Firm value
Costs
Government
Expenditure
Policy implications
Labour productivity
Social welfare
Financial performance
Fees
Local government
Stock performance
Public Administration

Bibliographical note

Firth acknowledges support from a grant from the Research Grants Council of the HKSAR (LU340610). Gong acknowledges support from a grant from the Research Grants Council of the HKSAR (PolyU 5427/09H).

Keywords

  • Cost of government
  • Firm value
  • Efficiency
  • Productivity
  • Grabbing hand
  • Political economy

Cite this

FIRTH, Michael ; GONG, Stephen X. ; SHAN, Liwei. / Cost of government and firm value. In: Journal of Corporate Finance. 2013 ; Vol. 21. pp. 136-152.
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Cost of government and firm value. / FIRTH, Michael; GONG, Stephen X.; SHAN, Liwei.

In: Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 21, 06.2013, p. 136-152.

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)Researchpeer-review

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