Abstract
Delusional beliefs are paradigmatic examples of irrational states of mind. But as soon as we inquire more deeply into the relationship between delusions and rationality, we find ourselves in a maze of questions and puzzles. In this chapter we try to work our way through this maze. We begin by establishing that delusions are beliefs, mental states that by nature are subject to rational evaluation. We then argue that delusions are abnormally irrational beliefs, and in particular that delusions violate principles of both substantive (epistemic) rationality as well as structural rationality. To bolster this case, we consider and reject a number of views which deny that delusions are abnormally irrational beliefs, including Brendan Maher’s well-known view that since delusions are formed in response to highly abnormal experiences, they are no less rational than ordinary beliefs. We then examine the prominent two-factor account of delusional belief, which builds on Maher’s proposal by posting a second, cognitive factor to explain delusional belief. This cognitive factor is intended to explain how delusional subjects depart from rationality. We end by considering the question of where to locate this departure from rationality in the course of the delusion.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Delusion |
Editors | Ema SULLIVAN-BISSETT |
Publisher | Routledge |
Chapter | 14 |
Pages | 215-227 |
Number of pages | 13 |
ISBN (Electronic) | 9781040133385 |
ISBN (Print) | 9781032283388, 9781032283432 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 15 Nov 2024 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© 2025 selection and editorial matter Ema Sullivan-Bissett; individual chapters, the contributors.