Demythologizing intuition

Jennifer Ellen NADO

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)peer-review

6 Citations (Scopus)


Max Deutsch’s new book argues against the commonly held ‘myth’ that philosophical methodology characteristically employs intuitions as evidence. While I am sympathetic to the general claim that philosophical methodology has been grossly oversimplified in the intuition literature, the particular claim that it is a myth that philosophers rely on intuitions as evidence is open to several very different interpretations. The plausibility and consequences of a rejection of the ‘myth’ will depend on the notion of evidence one employs, the notion of intuition one holds, and how one understands the idea of ‘relying on’ or ‘employing’ something as evidence. I describe what I take to be the version of The Myth which is most plausibly undermined by Deutsch’s arguments; however, I also argue that the falsity of this myth has only minimal consequences for the viability of the experimental philosophy research project.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)386-402
Number of pages17
JournalInquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy
Issue number4
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2017


  • Intuition
  • epistemology
  • metaphilosophy
  • philosophical methodology


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